Since mid-summer, Iraq has been gripped with violence, originating from a stand-off between rival Shia parties at the parliamentary premises in Baghdad. That crisis remains ongoing, between Muqtada al-Sadr and his opponents in the Iran-backed Coordination Framework. Framed as a conflict over who gets to name the country’s next prime minister, it actually runs far deeper than that and is about who gets the final say in Shia politics. The situation remains volatile in Baghdad, as other disturbances are rippling throughout the rest of Iraq. Many have been met with force and blamed on the Islamic State (ISIS). Former Iraqi Premier Haidar al-Abadi had famously declared victory over the terror group back in December 2017, but it looks like its making a slow yet steady comeback — ideologically at least —through hundreds of ISIS-affiliated families returning home after years of confinement at the dusty al-Hol camp of northeast Syria.
Terror Incubator
For three years now, al-Hol has been holding the highest concentration of ISIS members. Thousands were taken in after the collapse of the Islamic State’s last enclave in the Syrian town of Baghouz back in March 2019. Since then, the camp has been run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed Kurdish group that finds itself today increasingly incapable of policing and administering al-Hol. Running the camp costs too much for the Kurds, who would rather spend their oil money on buying arms and training their soldiers, ahead of any possible future confrontation with Turkey. For them, the situation becomes far more worrying in light of a steady rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara, which obviously would be at their expense. They have no time, money or manpower for al-Hol. For the past year and a half, they have been steadily downgrading their security.
According to the SDF, 93% of al-Hol’s 55-57,000 residents are women and children belonging to what is now commonly referred to as “ISIS families.” The camp holds approximately 47,000 Syrians and Iraqis, with an annex for 8,000 wives and children of ISIS fighters. Human Rights Watch puts the number at 43,000. In mid-2022, the SDF said that weapons and ammunition were discovered in al-Hol, while the US Treasury Department claims that the camp has become a magnet for ISIS finances. ISIS members use a special money transfer system to move an estimated $100 million in cash reserves. Additionally, at least 42 ISIS-style executions have been performed in al-Hol since the start of this year. Earlier in March 2021, the SDF said that they arrested five cell leaders in al-Hol, along with 53 ISIS suspects.
Over the past two months, the SDF has adopted a two-pronged strategy at al-Hol. One is a sweeping military operation, seconded by a green light for those unaffiliated with terror to leave the camp — a step seemingly taken at the urging of the Biden administration. More than 260 sleeper cells have been discovered within the camp since mid-September. Some were caught raising ISIS flags on their balconies, while ISIS propaganda material was discovered in their living quarters. The SDF says that it also discovered 25 tunnels being dug by al-Hol residents, and arms stockpiled (assault rifles, rocketed propelled grenades, and 25 hand grenades). It is being described as the largest cache of arms since the 2019 liberation of Baghouz.
As for those who have been allowed to leave, most find themselves unwanted in their home countries, with the notable exception of Austria, which recently announced that it would repatriate women and children of ISIS families coming from al-Hol. Iraq, too, has taken similar steps, allowing 150 households to return home — all former residents of al-Hol. Another 350 households are expected back by December. They are presently being accommodated at the Jedaa camp in the Ninewa province for a period of six months that ends in February 2023. Security at the Jedaa camp is not that great. Many of the returnees can, and have already, bribed their way through Iraqi security, managing to enter adjacent Iraqi towns and cities.
An ISIS Comeback?
A recent report shows that ISIS manpower in both Syria and Iraq stands at 10,000 fighters. However, the number of young men that these fighters can recruit and indoctrinate is theoretically unlimited. The group remains active on online jihadist forums, and it uses encrypted chat apps to work around bans imposed by Twitter and Facebook. Their main venue is a Russian social media network called Tam Tam, where they have posted a 216-page illustrated manual for the “novice jihadist fighter,” along with a downloadable instruction video on how to make a one-shot gun for close range assassinations.
Over the past ten months ISIS cells have carried out a series of deadly attacks in Syria and Iraq, the biggest of which was at a crowded Baghdad market in January 2021. The Iraqi attacks can be traced back to the original ISIS group that was founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and originated from al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq. The Syrian attacks were more homegrown and ad hoc, claimed by groups that might be affiliated ideologically with ISIS, but which have received none of ISIS’s arms or training. After their last major defeat in Syria in 2019, ISIS fighters simply shaved off their beards, took off their military uniforms, and blended with Syrian and Iraqi tribal society. Many found sanctuary within their home communities, while others denied having ever worked with the Islamic group, thanks to the alias names that they had used. And yet, every now and then, we hear statements from Iraqi officials, about ISIS sleeping cells, especially now with the return of people from al-Hol.
A Genuine Threat?
Is the threat authentic? Or have Iraqi leaders been exaggerating it for political purposes, both prior to the October 2021 parliament elections and after? After all, it is always easy to blame anything on ISIS — easy and beneficial. An ISIS threat scares all minorities into submission and plays out well for Shia parties who are struggling to unite their ranks in light of Muqtada al-Sadr’s latest ambitions.
Last month, a police station was attacked near the al-Mutassim neighborhood, southeast of Saddam Hussein’s home city of Tikrit. Although no ISIS flags were raised, and no ISIS affiliation was found, authorities immediately blamed the attack on the terror group. ISIS, however, has not claimed the attack. The group was also blamed for another shooting in the shrine city of Samarra, and a man who was caught in Diyala armed with an explosive belt that was reportedly to be used against Shia pilgrims. On September 19, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) said that they had clashed with ISIS militias south of Mosul, claiming to have killed several of them. Their names were not identified.
The ISIS scapegoat is also suitable for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which is facing its own nest of problems. Last month, there were demonstrations in Arbil and Sulaimaniyyah, which led to the arrest of 600 people, including 11 journalists. Kurdish authorities have responded by raiding the offices of demonstrators and confiscating their PCs. The demonstrators are demanding better pay and more government jobs — two grievances that are not exclusive to Iraqi Kurdistan and are widespread in territories under control of the Mustapha al-Kadhimi government. If these demonstrations are repeated in the upcoming weeks, then there won’t be a parliamentary election in Iraqi Kurdistan this year, originally scheduled for this month.
Last month, an IED struck at a police station in western Kirkuk while a homemade bomb exploded in front of a shopping mall in the Zayouna neighborhood of Baghdad. Both attacks caused collateral damage, with no loss in life, but they too were blamed on ISIS. Also, in Kirkuk, there was a shooting from a car on members of the police, killing one man. Another car bomb exploded in Diyala, killing one policeman, while ISIS was blamed for an ambush against Kurdish troops near Wadi al-Shay.
Conclusion
The ISIS accusation is a ready-made one for both the central government in Baghdad and for the KRG. It unites Iraqis, whether Kurds or Shia Arabs, and helps them overcome their political differences — even if only temporary. They slap the ISIS label on anybody who holds arms or had served previously with any of the armed militias. Whether that labeling is authentic or not requires plenty of investigation and intelligence sharing, along with information that is shared with the media and the wider public. To date, none of that has happened.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
