Since the U.S. allowed the Taliban-Qaeda forces to retake Afghanistan in 2021, there have been concerns that history will repeat itself: it was in Taliban- and Al-Qaeda-ruled Afghanistan that the 9/11 attacks were planned. It is, therefore, of interest that Al-Qaeda has put out a statement claiming it will not use Afghanistan as a launchpad for attacks on the West. There is, of course, little reason to believe Al-Qaeda or any other jihadist group. It does, however, constitute a milestone—this is the first “official”, public limitation Al-Qaeda Central (AQC) has put on its external operations—and it provides an opportunity, two decades on from that awful Tuesday morning, to assess Al-Qaeda’s intentions and capabilities when it comes to global terrorism.
Al-Qaeda has undergone major structural and strategic evolutions since 2001. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) physically impacted Al-Qaeda’s capacities and intensified changes in its strategic thinking, focusing it more locally and moving it away from global terrorism, a process quickened and expanded since 2011, by the demise of Usama bin Laden, the war in Syria, and above all the rise of the Islamic State as a challenger for the leadership of global jihad. With the death of Bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in July 2022, it remains to be seen if Al-Qaeda will continue this trend, or turn back towards the kind of atrocities seen on 11 September 2001 that will forever be associated with its name.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
