Farzad Ramezani Bonesh, researcher and analyst of international affairs
The Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP or ISIS-K) officially started its activities in Afghanistan in 2014 declaring it to be the Khorasan Province of Islamic Caliphate. The legitimate government of Afghanistan claimed that ISKP had been destroyed in 2019, but the presence of ISKP continued, claiming dozens of attacks in 2021-22.
Nangarhar and Kunar were the main bases of ISKP in eastern Afghanistan, but after the Taliban came to power in August 2021, despite the Taliban’s claims of destroying ISKP in most of Afghanistan, the group is still considered to be a serious threat in the country.
Also, despite claims of the discovery and arrest of ISKP by the Taliban in the past months, their deadly attacks such as the January 11 suicide bombing near the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan (MFA) in Kabul left dozens of Taliban, ordinary people, and foreign citizens killed and wounded.
In fact, it is very difficult to access the exact number of ISKP forces in Afghanistan. Some Western and international sources have estimated the number of ISKP fighters in Afghanistan to be around 1,500-2,200 fighters. Zamir Kabulov, the representative of the Russian President in Afghanistan, also estimated the number of ISKP fighters in Afghanistan to be 6,000.
After a year and a half of the Taliban’s returned rule in Afghanistan, among the different views on the situation of ISKP, it seems that we are witnessing a kind of stabilization of ISKP and its decentralization into cells and small groups throughout the country.
Taliban Rule
The Taliban’s ascent to power in Afghanistan led to the release of ISKP fighters from prison and the strengthening of its recruitment program from villages and former Afghan state forces.
Under the Taliban, terrorism has increased in Afghanistan. As of 2021-2022, Afghanistan ranked first in the number of deaths caused by terrorism.
Some Taliban leaders are trying to secure various concessions from neighboring and Western governments (who are afraid of the group’s rise to power) by highlighting the threat of ISKP in Khorasan. They claim that it is possible that 7,000 ISKP could enter Afghanistan from Pakistan through the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Nangarhar, and Laghman. Additionally, the selective suppression of some ISKP branches in Afghanistan by the Taliban can help the Taliban play the ISKP card.
For example, the presence of ISKP in the Badakhshan province of Afghanistan (shared border with China and Tajikistan) can be used by the Taliban as a card for economic aid, political support, and diplomatic recognition. In fact, the continuation of a weak ISKP can be used by the Taliban as a playing card, but the expansion of its power poses a serious threat to the group.
It also seems that the Taliban leadership is divided on how to deal with ISKP, or some of them favor a ‘kind attitude’ towards ISKP. Even by clearing or expelling a part of their forces and putting pressure on extremist allied groups inside Afghanistan, the Taliban helps ISKP in recruitment. On the other hand, if the Taliban do not have enough financial power, some branches of the Taliban may join ISKP. In fact, the dwindling of the Taliban’s economic power could boost ISKP’s economic appeal.
The Spread of Poverty
Afghanistan is heading for an economic and human collapse, and the economy has an important role in the possibility of wider support for ISKP. Many believe that if the economic situation in Afghanistan does not improve, even the Taliban may lose members to ISKP.
A collapsing economy increases the risk of extremism. Apart from social divisions, rising unemployment and the spread of poverty exposes Afghanistan to the risk of ISKP growth. If ISKP offers more attractive financial incentives to potential recruits, it may attract many villagers and disadvantaged people to its support program.
The Outbreak of Civil War
The refusal of the Taliban to form an inclusive government could lead to a civil war. In the meantime, if northern Afghanistan becomes the center of major resistance against the Taliban, ISKP will actually benefit from the power vacuum in the south and east and even the west and north of the country. In fact, ISKP is already thinking about ways it could benefit from such chaos.
In the last two years, ISKP has strengthened its media arm and paid special attention to disseminating propaganda, translating materials into different languages—including English, Tajik, Uzbek, Farsi, Pashto, and Uyghur—in an attempt to overcome ethnic and linguistic differences to promote the caliphate as a saving vision. The group also tries to give news coverage of its attacks.
ISKP attacks have also become more geographically dispersed, and the combat method of complex suicide, explosive, and terror attacks in cities has changed.
With accusations such as the Taliban’s deviation from the principles of jihad, alliances with foreigners and Christians, cooperation with tyrant regimes, relations with Iran, etc., ISKP is trying to create major divisions among Taliban supporters. ISKP is also trying to take advantage of moderate-extremist tensions and competition and the Haqqani-Kandahar Taliban network.
Therefore, any expulsion of extremist Taliban forces is considered to be in ISKP’s favor (an opportunity to recruit). The group also hopes to sever the Taliban’s connection with foreign groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and attract their members.
Geopolitical Ambiguity
Although, in practice, the 83-member global coalition to defeat ISIS is crucial to ensure the permanent defeat of ISIS, including in Afghanistan, the lack of external coordination and decision-making by rival actors regarding Afghanistan allows ISKP to remain a serious threat.
Meanwhile, some actors such as Russia accuse the West of secretly supporting ISKP. If ISKP tries to recruit thousands of foreign fighters in Afghanistan, it will probably be able to boost its power and influence. In this scenario, ISKP will continue to exploit the Taliban’s relationship with foreign powers, anti-Western, anti-Russian and anti-Iranian, anti-Chinese, and anti-Indian propaganda, to show that it is different from other jihadist groups and recruit new members accordingly.
Even the ISKP in Pakistan and the strengthening of the Pakistani sub-branches of ISKP can certainly boost ISKP’s influence in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
As a result, Taliban actions in the security, political, diplomatic, and economic fields play a pivotal role in either defeating or strengthening ISKP in Afghanistan. Despite the possibility of more external pressure on the Taliban to focus their attacks on ISKP, the Taliban probably cannot or will not completely defeat ISKP.
It seems that ISKP will boost its recruitment activities, and its operational alliance with other groups is intended to strengthen their presence in Afghanistan.
ISKP may not be able to recruit more than 10,000 troops, but taking into account overall conditions in Afghanistan, including security, political, diplomatic, economic, etc., ISKP will continue to strengthen its position in the country.
This effectively could make ISKP the most powerful branch of ISIS. In fact, the continuation of current conditions is working in their favor, and their presence among the four deadliest organizations in the world on the list of global terrorism will continue.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
