Ginevra Filindassi, a Masters in International Relations and European Studies
Over the last two decades, and more specifically since 9/11, several European countries have been caught by surprise terrorist attacks, exposing intelligence failures. [1] Both public opinion and experts have accused — in some cases rightly so — national intelligence agencies of being the root cause of those failures. [2] However, in most cases, the main problem is the lack of organization and cooperation within the security system, in which many actors are involved (intelligence agencies, police, policymakers, lawmakers and the justice system). Even in countries that have cooperative and coordinated security systems, there are other inefficiencies such as weak deradicalization policies or lack of CVE programs.
This article will focus on the counter-terrorism policies and security systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Italy and analyze their mistakes. After a brief evaluation of the different countries and their weaknesses, it will be easier to understand the problems and how best to fix them.
The United States
The 9/11 attack in New York City is probably the most obvious example of weak cooperation between security agencies. The structure and functionality of the security system were heavily criticized for the monumental failure. [3] First of all, the abundance of different agencies, both military and civil, complicated the already difficult job of maintaining national security. Furthermore, this complex system did not have proper coordination, an effective chain of command or clear hierarchies. These inefficiencies proved to be fatal. For example, the structure of the FBI and the CIA did not facilitate any information sharing on suspected terrorists. [4] So, while 9/11 was one of the most dramatic terrorist attacks in history, it also served as a wake-up call.
The United Kingdom
The UK faced numerous Islamist terror incidents following the first attack that occurred in 2005. The UK had some structural flaws in its security system [5] such as a lack of cooperation between intelligence agencies and police. [6] Poor dialogue between MI5, MI6, GCHQ and police was clear in several of the terrorist attacks. The failure of these agencies to identify threats was well-documented in attacks that occurred in 2005, 2013 and 2017. [7] In those cases, police and intelligence forces had crucial information about the attackers, but did not recognize the danger they posed or share the information, which proved to be fatal.
The attacks in the UK highlighted a direct link between radicalization and petty crime. It also revealed the domestic nature of this kind of terrorism, as most attackers were British citizens. Terrorism was evolving and becoming not only a security concern, but a social concern.
When the UK realized the serious flaws in their security system, they decided to step up active collaboration between intelligence agencies, and cooperation between those agencies and the police, considering the criminal background of many terrorists and the role jails played in the radicalization process. The attacks also highlighted another problem: a lack of social inclusivity in previous decades.
France
The French example highlights the importance of a legal framework as one of the most crucial aspects of an effective national security system. In 2008, France began enacting legislation which transformed national intelligence organizations. That change resulted in a completely different intelligence system known as Communauté francaise de renseignement. This system created new agencies and duties. However, the outcome was a fragmented system in which hierarchies and specific duties were not clear. [8] Cooperation between general and territorial intelligence agencies was never implemented. Meanwhile, jails were playing a bigger role in radicalization processes in France.
Belgium
In the case of Belgium, there are some similarities with the abovementioned examples such as poor cooperation between agencies. However, the country has also failed at the legislative and political level relating to intelligence/terrorism issues in the past few decades. It wasn’t until 1991 that Belgium came up with an effective intelligence framework. Even then, the country’s intelligence agencies continued to be particularly weak. Moreover, the era of digital information created the added issue of excess of information or ‘infobésité’ which complicates analysis.
Communication failures, lack of a coherent legal framework and a general political strategy towards intelligence resulted in critical inefficiencies. [9] In general, policymakers underestimated the issue of radicalization and extremism until it was too late.
Italy
Up until recently, Italy had been spared from Islamist terror attacks for several reasons, such as the demography of the Muslim population, past experience in combatting organized crime/internal terrorism and effective legislative reforms. For the purpose of this article, it is interesting to analyze how an otherwise cooperative and cohesive security system like the Italian one, lacked other crucial elements in the counter-terrorism sphere. In fact, the Italian legislative system appears to be particularly organized and effective in regard to security, intelligence and police cooperation — elements that other countries clearly do not have. This kind of cooperation proved to be an example to follow for the rest of Europe, due especially to the role of the DIS (coordination body inside the intelligence system, that connects the two AISE agencies and policymakers) and the C.A.S.A (an inter-forces body used solely for counter-terrorism, in which the police and intelligence forces regularly share information) [10].
Nonetheless, cooperation and information-sharing techniques are not enough to eradicate terrorism altogether. The Italian system is far from perfect considering the near total absence of proper preventive or counter-radicalization programs and/or laws. [11] These measures are required now more than ever in response to rapidly growing terrorism threats in Italy, even from Italian citizens. A two-track policy, which includes both preventive and repressive methods, seems to be the only way to oppose modern terrorism.
Conclusion
As analyzed above, counter-terrorism policies are always particularly difficult to manage for western countries, considering the various factors involved. The perfect formula does not exist, but it is possible to draw some conclusions supported by the above-analyzed examples. Regardless of the country, there are a few pre-conditions to implement in order to have a solid security system and effective counter-terrorism policies such as: a cohesive and well-defined intelligence system, some coordination and info-sharing mechanisms (especially between intelligence and police), a comprehensive understanding of how societal problems can lead to radicalization, coherent and clear legislation, proper attention from policymakers and the inclusion of soft measures and deradicalization programs.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
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References
[1] Marrin, S., (2004), Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(4), 655-672.
[2] Sandow-Quirk, M., (2002). A failure of intelligence, Prometheus, 20(2), 131-142.
[3] (Zegard, 2005; Wirtz, 2002)
[4] Dahl, E. J., (2013), Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond. Georgetown University Press.
[5] Gill, P., & Phythian M., (2012), Intelligence in an Insecure World, Polity Press.
[6] UK Intelligence and Security Committee, (2018), The 2017 Attacks: What needs to change?
[7] UK Intelligence and Security Committee, (2018), The 2017 Attacks: What needs to change?
[8] Hellmuth, D. (2015). Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(12).
[9] Lasoen, K.L., (2018), Plan B(ruxelles): Belgian Intelligence and the Terrorist Attacks of 2015-2016”, Terrorism and Political Violence.
[10] Mosca, C., Scandone G., Gambacurta S., Valentini M., (2008), I Servizi di Informazione e il Segreto di Stato (legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 124), Giuffrè Editore, Milano.
[11] Vidino, L. (2018). De-radicalization in the Mediterranean: Comparing challenges and approaches. ISPI
