Akram Umarov
Turkey became a significant partner to Central Asian countries starting immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Turkey expanded its geopolitical influence to the newly independent countries of the region by capitalizing on common history and culture. Ankara actively supported the dissemination of Pan-Turkish ideology in the region by establishing Turkish educational institutions in Central Asia, offering scholarships for Central Asian youth to study in Turkish universities and cultural exchanges.
The joint Turkish schools and universities in Central Asia played a significant role in promoting not only the ideology of Pan-Turkism, but also providing Islamic education. The regional countries, which supported these schools at the initial stages, later became suspicious of a “hidden agenda” of proselytizing the extremist religious views and further infiltration in the top-level government positions in various countries.[1] The existing analysis of this issue demonstrates the intention of the Nurcu movement and proponents of Fethullah Gulen to promote their version of Islamic education and placing allies in governmental circles of Central Asian countries. However, Nurcu movement members did not conduct terrorist acts in the region.
Background
Turkey was one of the first countries in the world that supported the gained independence of the Central Asian countries. Common Turkic ethnolinguistic background, historical and cultural ties played a crucial role in the increasing presence of Turkey in the region in the 1990s. Besides Turkey’s aim to enhance economic relations, one of the major reasons it was interested in Central Asian states was to establish a secular and democratic state with a predominantly Muslim population.[2]
The Turkish model of state-building was appealing to Central Asian states rather than the development models of other Muslim-dominant countries like Iran. The regional countries even replicated the Turkish system of creating the Muslim Spiritual Assembly headed by the Grand Mufti (religious leader) and secular State Committee for Religious Affairs to oversee the compliance of all religious organizations with legislation and established requirements.[3]
Main Activities
President Turgut Ozal actively promoted the expansion of the Turkish soft power in the region with the central idea of opening Turkish schools and universities in Central Asia.[4] Ankara offered scholarship programs to students from Central Asia to study in Turkey,[5] the Turkish government also broadcasted its national television channels in the region to boost its cultural presence.[6] The Nurcu movement was named after Turkish theologian Said Nursi. His disciple, Fethullah Gulen, later established his own movement and was responsible for the proliferation of schools in Central Asia.[7]
From 1991 to 1999, 29 schools were established in Kazakhstan, 18 in Uzbekistan, 13 in Turkmenistan, 12 in Kyrgyzstan and 5 in Tajikistan and in total more than 16,000 pupils were taught in these schools.[8] In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan the number of schools substantially increased in the 2000s. Because of deepening socio-economic problems, limited income and a public education crisis connected to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, these new schools were a great alternative, offering modern facilities and quality education. As a result, Turkish teachers were very popular among the common population. Turkish schools were able to produce educated students. Later Nursi and Gulen supporters established several Turkish universities in the region like Süleyman Demirel University in Kazakhstan; Atatürk Ala-Too University in Kyrgyzstan; and Turkmen-Turk University in Turkmenistan.[9]
Gulen adherents were very careful in the way they spread their religious ideology. They were familiar with existing concerns and suspicions regarding their activities in the region by Central Asian governments. Instead of using the method of propagating religious ideology directly (tabligh), they taught by personal example (temsil). This was done by following religious norms, being open and kind to people, being highly educated, and complying with moral restrictions.[10] Students lived in special dormitories together with their teachers and were in regular contact with them. Considering that these schools admitted children starting from the secondary education stage and taught them until admission to universities, Turkish teachers were able to interact with their students for a long period of time and establish a personal relationship with them.
Consequences
Despite exercising caution, the movement attracted the attention of the regional governments. After the terrorist attacks in Tashkent in February 1999, all Turkish schools were closed and their teachers were deported.[11] Uzbekistan took a tough stand against the Nurcu and Gulen movements in the country by outlawing their activities and deporting and prosecuting their supporters. The Nurcu movement and its ideology were subsequently labeled as “extremist and fundamentalist”.[12] In 2011, Turkmenistan also closed all Turkish schools in its provinces except for the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk School in Ashbagat.[13]
The rise of the Islamist Justice and Development Party in Turkey in 2003 and its close ties with the Nurcu and Gulen movements increased distrust of some Central Asian countries which began to question whether the aims of these organizations were genuine. After the school closures in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 2015, Tajikistan also decided to close Turkish schools.[14] This stance was in line with Dushanbe’s agenda of curtailing active religious organizations in the country and to prohibit the activities of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan.
After the coup attempt in July 2016 in Turkey, Ankara accused the Gulen movement of being behind it. Turkey required all countries with Nurcu and Gulen schools to transfer them to new administrations appointed by the new Turkish foundation “Maarif”.[15] Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did not oblige and instead increased state control of their activities. The members of the Nurcu movement were convicted of propagating extremist, fundamentalist ideas and establishing illegal religious organizations in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan during the period of 2009 to 2016.
Conclusion
Turkish schools were founded in Central Asia in the 1990s in order to promote the ideas of Pan-Turkism and to provide religious education in the region, and the Turkish government considerably supported them. The schools operated carefully and cautiously given that regional governments were highly suspicious of their activities. Rather than preach their ideology, the schools taught mainly through the personal example of their teachers who formed personal relationships with their students. This careful approach allowed them to continue their work in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan despite closures and prosecution in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
After the Gulen movement was labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey in 2016, the schools in Central Asia significantly scaled back their presence in the region, but did not stop their work entirely. Understanding the fears of national governments, these schools replaced the majority of Turkish teachers with national cadres and increased the transparency of their activities to the public. Therefore, the presence of Nurcu and Gulen adherents in much lower than before and graduates of Turkish schools are not fully considered as supporters of these organizations. The existing research demonstrates that the schools indeed had a hidden agenda of proselytism and expanding their ideology in the region.[16] However, they have not been involved in terrorist acts in Central Asia and currently have limited ability to work underground.
REFERENCES
[1] Paul Alexander. Turkey on Diplomatic Push to Close Schools Linked to Influential Cleric. // VOA news, 31 August 2017. https://www.voanews.com/europe/turkey-diplomatic-push-close-schools-linked-influential-cleric
[2] Cennet Engin Demir, Ayse Balci & Fusun Akkok (2000) “The role of Turkish schools in the educational system and social transformation of Central Asian countries: The case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan”, Central Asian Survey, 19:1, 141-155, DOI: 10.1080/713656175
[3] Bayram Balci. Turkey’s Religious Outreach and the Turkic World. // Hudson Institute, 11 March 2014. https://www.hudson.org/research/10171-turkey-s-religious-outreach-and-the-turkic-world
[4] Thomas Wheeler. Turkey’s role and interests in Central Asia. // Saferworld, October 2013. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/turkeys-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf
[5] Gonul Tol. Turkey’s Bid for Religious Leadership: How the AKP Uses Islamic Soft Power? // Foreign Affairs, 10 January 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-01-10/turkeys-bid-religious-leadership
[6] Görkem Dirik. From hostility to fraternity: Turkish-Uzbek relations. // Daily Sabah, 21 June 2019. https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/06/21/from-hostility-to-fraternity-turkish-uzbek-relations
[7] Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell. Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU. // Silk Road Paper, July 2006. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30281/14_Islam_Radicalisim_Central_Asia.pdf
[8] Bayram Balci (2003) “Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam”, Religion, State & Society, 31:2, 151-177, DOl: 10.1080/0963749032000074006
[9] Serkan Demirtaş. Turkish intelligence agency report describes massive global Gülenist organization. // Hurriyet Daily News, 29 May 2017. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-intelligence-agency-report-describes-massive-global-gulenist-organization–113634
[10] Bayram Balci. Turkey’s Religious Outreach and the Turkic World. // Hudson Institute, 11 March 2014. https://www.hudson.org/research/10171-turkey-s-religious-outreach-and-the-turkic-world
[11] Sebastiano Mori and Leonardo Taccetti. Rising Extremism in Central Asia? Stability in the Heartland for a Secure Eurasia. // European Institute for Asian Studies, February 2016. http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/EIAS_Briefing_Paper_2016_Mori_Taccetti_Central_Asia.pdf
[12] Uzbek court jails members of Turkish Islamic sect. // UzDaily.com, 19 February 2009. https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/4950
[13] Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. Turkmenistan: Turkish Schools Closed Amid Concerns of Spread of Nurchilar Movement. // Eurasianet, 22 August 2011. https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-turkish-schools-closed-amid-concerns-of-spread-of-nurchilar-movement
[14] Samantha Brletich. Tajikistan, Turkey and the Gülen Movement. // The Diplomat, 21 August 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/tajikistan-turkey-and-the-gulen-movement/
[15] Barçın Yinanç. FETÖ schools abroad handed over to Turkey saw rise in student numbers: Foundation head. // Hurriyat Daily News, 4 February 2019. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/feto-schools-abroad-handed-over-to-turkey-saw-rise-in-student-numbers-foundation-head-140982
[16] Bayram Balci (2003) “Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam”, Religion, State & Society, 31:2, 151-177, DOl: 10.1080/0963749032000074006
