European Eye on Radicalization
Fighting in Tripoli not only signals that GNA-aligned militias (Government of National Accord) are losing the battle against the Libyan National Army headed by Khalifa Haftar, but it also clearly indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood-Islamist alliance in Libya is losing its grip on power to non-Islamic factions inside Libya. As a result, Ankara’s intervention in Libya should not be understood solely within the prism of preventing Haftar’s liberation of Tripoli, but bolstering Islamists inside Libya.
This article intends to explain the security situation inside Tripoli before Haftar’s current military operation to liberate Tripoli from GNA-affiliated militias. Subsequently, it will analyze how the battle for Tripoli has altered the balance of power between militias aligned to Islamists and non-Islamists. Finally, it will analyze the Turkish role in altering this balance of power through its backing of Islamists factions.
The Tripoli Cartel
Before General Khalifa Haftar declared his military operation to wrest Tripoli from GNA-aligned militia control, there were four main militias in Tripoli that dominated the city. These four groups were: the Rapid Intervention led by Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, aka Ghenewa, who previously fought alongside the Libya Dawn Coalition aligned with Al Qaeda, and the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, led by Haitham al-Tajuri, who has been named in 2016 UN reports for financial fraud and human rights infringements.[1] His faction is nominally affiliated with the Interior Ministry of the GNA.[2] Other groups include the al-Nawasi Brigade, led by the Qadour family, which is mentioned in 2018 UN report for its criminal activities and is also loosely affiliated to the Interior Ministry.[3] Finally, there is the RADA Special Deterrence Forces, led by Abdulrauf Kara,[4] which is considered to be a Madkhali Salafist current that adopts an extreme interpretation of Islam and rejects democracy.[5] Together, all four of these militias were named “The Tripoli Cartel”.
Politically, the Muslim Brotherhood represented in the Justice and Construction party (JCP) fared badly in the June 2014 elections for the House of Representatives. It refused to acknowledge its defeat in the elections, however, and aligned itself with Libya Dawn, an alliance of extremist militias which took control of Tripoli militarily in the summer of 2014. Currently, JCP holds sway over the GNA government as its members and associates hold positions of power in the political, security, and economic sectors.[6] The JCP also formed an alliance with powerful militias in Misrata. However, this alliance has frayed as many militia members believe that they did not gain much from it, especially as they are not ideologically sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood ideology.[7]
An Alliance of Convenience
Power dynamics in Tripoli shifted significantly during the past several months as the influence and power of the four mentioned militias decreased significantly. In fact, the majority of forces came from Misrata, Zawiya, Nalut, among others compromising more than 70% of the overall fighting force, whose aggregate number is estimated to be around 5,750 fighters.[8]
It is worth mentioning that all these factions do not have much in common except sharing a common enemy: the Libyan National Army. The different factions aligned with the GNA have been fighting each other for the last three years as they battle for control over the capital, assert political control, seize territory and reap economic benefits from Libya’s vast oil and gas resources. The Tripoli Cartel aligned together in order to drive Misrata’s militias and other rival militias out of Tripoli in May 2017.[9] Even the Salah Badi brigade bombarded Ghenewa’s forces in Tripoli in late 2018.[10]
However, after the LNA succeeded in imposing a siege on Tripoli, the city’s militias suffered huge losses. Weakened, they sought help from Misrata’s militias. Taking into consideration all this rivalry and the declining power of The Tripoli Cartel, it could be argued that the balance of power in Tripoli has tilted in favor of the Misrata militias. This development undermines the influence of Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist factions in any future settlement of the Libyan conflict, be it a negotiated settlement or an imposed military solution.
Turkey’s Extremist Alliances
Turkey’s alliances with terrorist organizations in Libya and Syria, as well as other countries, are well documented by reliable sources in the Western press and even in academic periodicals. However, Turkey’s overt utilization of terrorist groups in the Libyan conflict — at a time when the US is conducting counter-terrorism operations in Libya against ISIS and Al Qaeda extremists — reveals that Ankara’s options in Libya are dwindling and that its Muslim Brotherhood allies are facing existential threats.
This could be attributed to the fact that the militias battling the LNA in Tripoli are not losing the battle, but also to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and its extremist allies are losing influence to the rising Misrata militias. In this context, Ankara’s intervention in the Libyan conflict is not only intended to prevent Tripoli’s militias from losing the battle against the LNA, but also to restore the balance of power between extremists and non-extremist factions, by sending Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS and Al Qaeda-aligned fighters to Libya.
Relocating ISIS
The decision was taken to relocate ISIS from Syria to Libya as these fighters have little work left for them inside Syria, especially after most military operations have ceased against Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria due to the Putin-Erdogan agreement.[11] Moreover, Libya is economically important to Turkey, hence, investing in jihadist mercenaries there would be worthwhile in Erdogan’s calculation.
Utilizing ISIS in Syria is difficult because of Russia’s dominant role there, so Erdogan believes that sending them to another battlefield is the better option. In addition to this, it benefits Ankara to get ISIS away from Turkish borders. ISIS has also made it clear that Libya will be their next area of operations. In a July 2019 video by Libyan ISIS leader, Mahmud Massud al-Baraassi, also known as Abu Musab Allibi, he said that “Libya was now one of the main axes of future ISIS operations, which is designed to compensate for the loss of ground” in Syria.[12]
There are several indicators that Turkey has already began transferring extremists to Libya. First, the U.S. embassy in Libya was alerted to the development and issued a statement on January 5, arguing that the country’s recent “deterioration in security underscores the dangers of toxic foreign interference in Libya, such as the arrival of Syrian fighters supported by Turkey as well as the deployment of Russian mercenaries”.[13] Second, senior Turkish officials confirmed this deployment to Reuters. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a war monitor, also revealed that 300 pro-Turkey Syrian fighters had been transferred to Libya and that others were training in Turkish camps.[14] Third, reports of Syrian fighters identified by their accents appearing on the streets of Tripoli went viral on social media networks. One of these fighters is Sultan Murad, who has been active in the Syrian war and is linked to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.[15] Fourth, it was observed that jihadist tactics used by ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria were being used in the battle for Tripoli in late December 2019, after Ankara’s decision to relocate Syrian fighters to Libya.[16]
Conclusion
Libya presents another example of how Ankara is utilizing terrorist organizations in order to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, in order to prevent them from losing power, and to assure that they will be a part of any future settlement, especially as the UN claims that there is no military solution for the Libyan crisis.
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References
[1] UN report for financial fraud and human rights infringements, OPEMAM, March 17, 2017, https://bit.ly/36y7xNK
[2] Libya: Civilians Killed in Tripoli Clashes, Human Rights Watch, September 1, 2018, https://bit.ly/2FxXcVY
[3] Jason Pack, Kingdom Of Militias: Libya’s Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession, ISPI, May 2019, (p. 26), https://bit.ly/2N9clkZ .
[4] Tripoli Gripped by Fear as Libyan National Army Marches on Capital, Asharq Al-Awsat, April 6, 2019, https://bit.ly/2N6mY84
[5] Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli, The Arc of Crisis in the Mena Region: Fragmentation, Decentralization, and Islamist Opposition, Milano, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2018, p. 132.
[6] Ibid., p. 128.
[7] Ibid., p. 128.
[8] Wolfram Lacher, WHO IS FIGHTING WHOM IN TRIPOLI? How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape, Small Arms Survey, August 2019, https://bit.ly/30cfKox
[9] Wolfram Lacher, Tripoli’s Militia Cartel: How Ill-Conceived Stabilisation Blocks Political Progress, and Risks Renewed War, SWP Comments, no. 20, April 2018, https://bit.ly/2QChKmx
[10] Sami Zaptia, Tripoli militia war. A lull in fighting or a permanent ceasefire: Analysis, Libya Herald, September 26, 2018, https://bit.ly/2QxPKk6
[11] Sami Moubayed, Turkey sends Syrian mercenaries to fight on its behalf in Libya, Gulf News, January 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/2N5B6OQ
[12] Edith M. Lederer, UN report says Libya will be new frontier for Islamic State, The Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 2019, https://bit.ly/2QUt900
[13] Tom O’connor, Donald Trump Wants Other Countries More Involved In Middle East, But Russia And Turkey Already Are, Newsweek, January 8, 2020, https://bit.ly/36E0Fy6
[14] Orhan Coskun, Turkey mulls sending allied Syrian fighters to Libya –sources, Reuters, December 30, 2019, https://reut.rs/3061ugF
[15] Sami Moubayed, Turkey sends Syrian mercenaries to fight on its behalf in Libya, Gulf News, January 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/2N5B6OQ
[16] Lamine Ghanmi, Turkey deploys jihadist proxies in Libya amid rush for gas in Mediterranean, The Arab Weekly, January 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/3a26FmG
