Arlinda Rrustemi, a politics lecturer and a Director of Peace Analytics at Leiden University in the Netherlands, where her research focuses inter alia on peace-building, humanitarian interventions, democracy, conflict resolution, the geopolitics of the Gulf states, Russia, Turkey, China, and Iran
Introduction
The Ukrainian war has resulted in many geopolitical changes across the world, uniting the Western democratic countries, while revealing the countries and leaders who are skeptical of the current international global order based around things like the United Nations Charter. This occurs at sub-national levels, too, with Chechnya as a prime example of such a division. In Ukraine, there are Chechens fighting for the Russians, drawn from the government forces of the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation, and there are Chechen battalions, drawn largely from Chechens forced to live outside their country, who are fighting for an independent, democratic Ukraine. This article attempts to shed more light on the current violent extremism trends in Chechnya in light of the war in Ukraine. The following sections will describe the historical context, while analyzing the leadership and the role of foreign fighters in Ukraine. The conclusions point to the importance of leadership in any struggle for independence, and consider the role of religion—which for most Chechens is Islam[1]—as a driver of discontent against autocratic governments.
Historical Context
Chechnya is located in the Caucasus, and has a turbulent history with Russia, one that has parallels with Ukraine. The first major Russian incursion into Chechnya took place in the early eighteenth century, but it was not until the late nineteenth century that the area was fully incorporated into the Russian Empire. There was considerable fighting in Chechnya after the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War it caused between 1917 and 1923. After the Bolshevik triumph, Chechnya was no more acquiescent to the new Soviet authorities than they had been to Imperial Russia.
For the Chechens, there was an additional irritant in relation to the Soviet regime: the Soviets carried out a ruthless campaign to repress religion,[2] and the Chechen resistance to Russian occupation had largely been religious in nature.[3] Trying to mix concessions with brutality, the Communists granted Chechnya a measure of autonomy in 1936 as the “Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic”. The polity was effectively destroyed in 1944, however, when the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered the deportation of effectively the whole nation, about half-a-million people, to Central Asia, accusing them of being Nazi collaborators, but really being angered at the Chechens’ continued resistance to Soviet rule.[4] More than 150,000 people were killed in the deportations.
Chechens were allowed to return to their homeland in 1956 and the Republic was re-established in 1957 as part of the de-Stalinization process. For the next three decades, Chechnya lived under the Soviet dictatorship. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Chechnya declared its independence from the new Russian Federation. Post-Soviet Russia was in chaos—the political turmoil was so extreme by late 1993 it led to the government having to shell its own parliament—that Moscow was unable to do anything about Chechnya for three years.
Russia launched a war to recapture Chechnya in 1994. The Russians inflicted a terrible cost on Chechnya, killing an estimated 100,000 people, a large portion of them civilians.[5] But, not unlike with the recent invasion of Ukraine, the war revealed the Russian army to be weaker than expected. Russia lost around 3,000 troops,[6] a staggering number when it is considered how heavily outnumbered Chechen forces were,[7] and by 1996 the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, was forced to sign a peace treaty recognizing the autonomy (though not the full independence) of Chechnya and Russian troops were withdrawn from the region.[8]
In September 1999, shortly after Vladimir Putin became Russian prime minister (he became president in December 1999), there were a series of mysterious apartment bombings in Moscow that were blamed on Chechen terrorists.[9] This was used as a casus belli to avenge the “humiliation” of the first war and to suppress the Chechen polity. To win this second war, the Russians adopted a twin-track approach of brutal methods combined with bribing key Chechen leaders to switch sides.[10] By February 2000, the Russians had captured—and destroyed—the Chechen capital, Grozny, and by the time the main phase of the war had wrapped up a few months later, 300,000 Chechens had been killed.[11]
In 2003, a new constitution, approved by a referendum, stipulated Chechnya’s status as a full Republic of the Russian Federation.[12] However, only in 2009 did Russia withdraw its occupation forces from Chechnya.[13]
Russia labelled its aggressive actions as anti- or counter-terrorist actions,[14] and labelled the fighters for Chechnya’s de facto government “bandits and terrorists”.[15] The terminology used by Moscow is important to keep in mind, as it points not only to the wide chasm in the perceptions of the conflict between Russians and Chechens,[16] but to how Russia under Putin justifies its aggressive, expansionist behavior. Though there are many differences, there is an eerie resemblance between the language used by the Russian government about Ukraine and what was said two decades ago in Chechnya.
Leadership: Ramzan Kadyrov’s Rule
As a means to strengthen Russia’s hold over Chechnya, in October 2003, Putin installed Akhmad Kadyrov as president. Kadyrov had been the Chief Mufti of Chechnya and one of the leaders of the Chechen resistance in the first war, but had changed sides later. Kadyrov was assassinated during the Victory Day parade in Grozny in May 2004 by another Chechen rebel leader, Shamil Basavey, who had his own agenda and long-standing links to Russia’s military intelligence (GRU).[17] Akhmad’s son, Ramzan, took over his father’s position in 2007, and still holds the post today.[18] The creation of a pro-Kremlin government in Chechnya, by combining brutality with the co-optation of former adversaries, suggests a potential model Putin envisions for Ukraine.[19] It has to be kept in mind, however, that while Ramzan is ostentatiously loyal to Putin—he has become known outside Russia for his effusive Instagram videos praising Putin—there is always an ambiguity when recruiting former enemies.[20]
The Ramzan-Putin partnership is held together by mutual benefits. Moscow has generously subsidized not only the rebuilding Chechnya under Ramzan, gaining the Chechen leader a measure of acceptance if not popularity, but also Ramzan’s own personal indulgences.[21] Russia has provided an estimated $7.8 billion to Chechnya between 2002 and 2012: all of it was supplied in the name of reconstruction, but what was actually done with the money is opaque.[22] In return for this, Ramzan has given unwavering support—political and military, supplying pro-Ramzan Chechen troops (often known as “Kadyrovtsy”)—to Putin’s attacks on Georgia in 2008, eastern Ukraine in 2014, and Syria after 2015.[23] It therefore comes as no surprise that this compact was upheld over Ukraine in 2022, with Ramzan once again supplying troops for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[24]
With Ramzan in power, the oil-rich Chechen Republic has enjoyed relative stability.[25] But it is a stability maintained by fear, violence, and repression: Ramzan has aggressively suppressed the free media and other civil liberties, and engaged in gross human rights violations, such as torture and kidnappings.[26] Ramzan’s primary task as Putin’s governor of Chechnya is to prevent the re-emergence of an insurgency, which has not been completely successful: the Islamic State (ISIS) has emerged in Chechnya, and other jihadist groups operate, though many went to Syria over the last few years. Ramzan’s “counter-insurgency strategy” is the intimidation of all dissent and the control of the civilian population through a wide-ranging surveillance state has been his method, even using assassination to uphold this system.[27] Ramzan’s assassination campaign has been so extensive has led some to argue that the notorious murders of journalists and other Kremlin critics are actually the work of the Kadyrovtsy, rather than Putin’s secret police.[28] The stifling of opposition in Chechnya even extends to the online world, with a vast digital surveillance apparatus able to spot signs of potential opposition. Ramzan has tried to use online media, particularly social media, to build up a cult of personality and portray his leadership as strong—and dedicated to the Kremlin. [29] Leaked voice memos Ramzan sent to troops during the Ukraine invasion show that Ramzan’s slavish devotion to Putin, and his conspiratorial beliefs, however outlandish they seem, are things he says in private, as well.[30]
If Putin succeeded in the “Kadyrovization” of Ukraine, the resulting government would be of a similar character: authoritarian, violent, and willing to send troops to engage in Kremlin military endeavors abroad. This has, so far, failed in Ukraine because the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, refused to abandon his post, famously telling the U.S., when they offered to evacuate him from Kyiv at the start of the invasion, “I need ammunition, not a ride”,[31] or to submit like Ramzan and become a Putin proxy. By fighting on—and with help from the West that Chechnya never received—Zelensky has been able to protect the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
Chechens in Ukraine: A Complex Fight
Two days after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ramzan claimed his forces were to be sent to join the battlefield.[32] The exact number of Kadyrovtsy on the ground in Ukraine is hard to confirm, though a number of sources suggest the answer is around 10,000.[33] Ramzan has kept up his use of social media during the Ukraine war to bolster the image of his own forces, showing their apparent exploits in cities like Mariupol, and used the platforms to encourage Putin to put aside any restraints in order to successfully complete the conquest of Ukraine. Ramzan has also framed his call for supporting Putin’s war on Ukraine as a religious duty on fellow Muslims.[34] Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the way Ramzan uses social media to create a make-believe image of his regime domestically, most military analysts see the role of the Kadyrovtsy in Ukraine as far more a social media and propaganda phenomenon than a military one, with the Kadyrovtsy posing for Instagram after areas are captured, but not actually playing a decisive role in the fighting.[35]
The clear echoes in Ukraine of what Putin did to Chechnya have made the war a subject of concern for Chechens all over the world, and meant that the intra-Chechen tensions of the 1990s have been introduced into Ukraine.[36] The Russian aggression in Ukraine has, ironically, created a space for the Chechen opposition to reactivate and to resume a war that for many Chechens never ended.[37] The anti-Ramzan/Putin Chechens have come to fight alongside Ukraine.[38] The antagonisms between the Chechen factions, originating in the second war when Chechens had to decide whether to submit to Russia’s overwhelming force or continue the guerrilla insurgency, have the format of a blood feud, and they are particularly difficult to prevent via traditional politics.[39]
The anti-Ramzan Chechen forces resent Ramzan for siding with Russia and live with the wounds of what the Russian army did to them and their homeland; by fighting for Ukraine, these Chechens can strike at both enemies.[40] The two main Chechen units supporting Ukraine are the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Forces, both of which have been fighting in Ukraine since 2014.[41] The Sheikh Mansur Battalion is mostly active in the southeast of Ukraine, particularly in Mariupol. For anti-Ramzan Chechens the war in Ukraine is part of the war for their own independence. This was expressed during the first wave of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 by General Isa Munayev, a policeman in Grozny when Russia flattened the city in 2000. Munayev bluntly said: “If Ukraine loses, Chechnya will lose”.[42] Munayev was killed in February 2015 in the Donbas.
An aspect that has been rather ignored when discussing the current conflict in Ukraine is religion. It is clear that at least part of Putin’s motivation for launching the war in the first place was religious, a desire to bring the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church back under the control of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, albeit this has not gone as intended, creating further ruptures in the Orthodox world.[43] With the intra-Chechen dimension to the war, Muslims are fighting Muslims, and for the estimated twenty million Russian Muslims—mostly in the Caucasus and Central Asia—this is raising difficult, fundamental questions about their beliefs.[44] The authority of Muslim clerics in Russia, who receive generous state subsidies, has been called into question by some, and if many Russian Muslims concluded that the clergy are wrong about the war in Ukraine, they might also conclude these clerics are wrong about Putin’s legitimacy to rule.[45] This is an aspect of the Ukrainian conflict that needs to be studied more deeply; it has the potential to destabilize regions and communities, and potentially remove Putin’s regime.
The involvement of Chechens in the Ukraine conflict has been ongoing since 2014, both with the Kadyrovtsy fighting for Russia and the pro-independence Chechens fighting for Ukraine. In a sense, both sides agree that the war over Chechen independence is being fought out on Ukrainian soil. While this might be a long-term issue, the more immediate effect is the potential of the pro-Ukrainian Chechens to mobilize the twenty million Russian Muslims to foment discontent against Putin’s regime—and by extension, the Muslims in the autocratic Central Asian states allied to the Kremlin. In this way, the fight for independence and democracy in Ukraine is not only about Ukraine: it has the potential to rewrite the geopolitical map in post-Soviet areas that have long been denied both things.
Conclusion
In a historical context both Ukraine and Chechnya have experienced struggles for independence from Russia, but the outcomes have been very different due to the differences in leadership. Ukraine remains committed to democracy and its sovereignty under Zelensky, whereas Chechnya is under the autocratic rule of Ramzan Kadyrov. The connection is more than just historical, however. Chechen fighters who fought for independence and those who fought for (or switched to) the Russian side are now fighting against each other in Ukraine, conducting their internal war while assisting opposing forces. Thus, the ethnic, religious, national, and political tensions surrounding Chechnya and its history are now at play in Ukraine. The ramifications for Russia and its “near abroad” could be seismic.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
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References
[1] ‘Chechnya Profile – Timeline’, 17 January 2018, BBC News. Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18190473
[2] Brown, R.E., 2019. Godless Utopia: Soviet Anti-Religious Propaganda.
[3] Halbach, U., ‘Islam in the North Caucasus’, 2001, Archives de sciences sociales des religions.
[4] Sultanov, A., Yelkhoyev, L., and Bigg, C., ‘“There Was No Water, No Food”—Chechens Remember Horror Of 1944 Deportations’, 22 February 2014, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 3 June 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/chechen-deportation-1944-survivors/25273614.html
[5] ‘Chechnya Profile’, 17 January 2018, BBC News. Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18188085
[6] ‘Chechnya Fast Facts’, 28 January 2021, Cable News Network (CNN). Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/17/world/europe/chechnya-fast-facts/index.html
[7] Hauer, N., ‘Chechens fighting Chechens in Ukraine’, 8 March 2022, New Lines Magazine. Retrieved 12 May 2022, https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/chechens-fighting-chechens-in-ukraine/
[8] Myre, G., ‘Russia’s wars in Chechnya offer a grim warning of what could be in Ukraine’, 12 March 2022, National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/12/1085861999/russias-wars-in-chechnya-offer-a-grim-warning-of-what-could-be-in-ukraine
[9] Salter, L., Lopez, L., and Kakoyiannis, A., ‘How the 1999 Russian apartment bombings led to Putin’s rise to power’, 7 April 2021, Business Insider. Retrieved 3 June 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-1999-russian-apartment-bombings-led-to-putins-rise-to-power-2018-3
[10] Hauer, ‘Chechens fighting Chechens in Ukraine’.
[11] Estemirova, L., ‘Putin’s Terror Playbook: If you want a picture of Ukraine’s future, look to my home, Chechnya’, 12 April 2022, The Guardian. Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/apr/13/russia-ukraine-chechnya-moscow-aggression-putin-victims
[12] ‘Chechnya Profile’, BBC News.
[13] ibid.
[14] Estemirova, ‘Putin’s Terror Playbook’
[15] Shapiro, A., Mehta, J., & Brown, A., ‘Chechnya once resisted Russia. Now, its leader is Putin’s brutal ally in Ukraine’, 27 April 2022, National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/04/27/1094873072/russia-ukraine-war-chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov
[16] Estemirova, ‘Putin’s Terror Playbook’
[17] Kagarlitsky, B., ‘We Don’t Talk to Terrorists. But Do We Help Them?’, 24 January 2000, Novaya Gazeta. Retrieved 3 June 2022 from http://www.compromat.ru/page_9424.htm
[18] ‘Chechnya Profile’, BBC News.
[19] Shuster, S., ‘Chechens are fighting Chechens in Ukraine’s Civil War’, 22 May 2015, Time Magazine. Retrieved 12 May 2022, https://time.com/3893066/chechens-ukraine-war/
[20] Petkova, M., ‘What role is Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov playing in Ukraine War?’, 24 March 2022, Al-Jazeera. Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/what-role-is-chechnyas-ramzan-kadyrov-playing-in-ukraine
[21] Fuller, L., ‘Analysis: Kadyrov’s Chechnya appears exempt from Russian funding cuts’, 30 July 2017. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 11 May 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-kadyrov-chechnya-exempt-funding-cuts/28648698.html
[22] Petkova, ‘What role is Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov playing in Ukraine War?’
[23] ibid.
[24] ibid.
[25] ibid.
[26] Shuster, ‘Chechens are fighting Chechens in Ukraine’s Civil War’.
[27] Shapiro et al., ‘Chechnya once resisted Russia. Now, its leader is Putin’s brutal ally in Ukraine’
[28] Sokirianskaia, E., ‘Is Chechnya Taking Over Russia?’ 17 August 2017, The New York Times. Retrieved 3 June 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/opinion/chechnya-ramzan-kadyrov-russia.html
[29] Shapiro et al., ‘Chechnya once resisted Russia. Now, its leader is Putin’s brutal ally in Ukraine’
[30] Petkova, ‘What role is Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov playing in Ukraine War?’
[31] Braithwaite, S., ‘Zelensky refuses US offer to evacuate, saying “I need ammunition, not a ride”,’ 26 February 2022, CNN. Retrieved 3 June 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html
[32] Hauer, ‘Chechens fighting Chechens in Ukraine’, and & Petkova, ‘What role is Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov playing in Ukraine War?’
[33] Crews, R. D., ‘Muslims are fighting on both sides in Ukraine’, 10 March 2022, The Washington Post. Retrieved 12 May 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/10/ukraine-war-muslims-conflict-chechnya/
[34] Petkova, ‘What role is Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov playing in Ukraine War?’
[35] Mustaffa, M. ‘The Kadyrovtsy: Putin’s Force Multiplier or Propaganda Tool?’, 4 March 2022, Newlines Magazine. Retrieved 3 June 2022, https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/the-kadyrovtsy-putins-force-multiplier-or-propaganda-tool/
[36] Shuster, ‘Chechens are fighting Chechens in Ukraine’s Civil War’.
[37] ibid.
[38] Hauer, ‘Chechens fighting Chechens in Ukraine’.
[39] Shuster, ‘Chechens are fighting Chechens in Ukraine’s Civil War’.
[40] Crews, ‘Muslims are fighting on both sides in Ukraine’.
[41] Hauer, ‘Chechens fighting Chechens in Ukraine’.
[42] Shuster, ‘Chechens are fighting Chechens in Ukraine’s Civil War’.
[43] Elie, P., ‘The Long Holy War Behind Putin’s Political War in Ukraine’, 21 April 2022, The New Yorker. Retrieved 3 June 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-long-holy-war-behind-putins-political-war-in-ukraine
[44] Shuster, ‘Chechens are fighting Chechens in Ukraine’s Civil War’, and Crews, ‘Muslims are fighting on both sides in Ukraine’.
[45] ibid.
