Akram Umarov, independent policy analyst in Uzbekistan
The signing of the peace deal between the US and the Taliban in Doha on 29 February opened new discussions about its implications on the current situation in Afghanistan and on the interests of the leading external forces in the Afghan conflict. In this regard, the role of Iran may have tremendous impact on the chances for peace and stability. The close and diversified relations of Tehran with many powerful political and military groups in Afghanistan gives it exceptional influence on the internal and foreign political dynamics of the country. Especially notable are Iran’s relations with the Taliban, which have been evolving for over a decade. In recent years, this relationship transformed from complete hostility to versatile collaboration. This cooperation is mostly based on converging interests of resistance to the Western military presence in Afghanistan, ostensible joint commitment to combating the Islamic State (Daesh), and other mutual foes, internal and external.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRAN-TALIBAN RELATIONS
Iran’s Links With The Taliban’s Leadership
In the 1990s, Iran had hostile relations with Taliban for a period after the Taliban attacked the Hazara Shi’is in Afghanistan. The culmination of the confrontation was the capture of the Consulate General of Iran in the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998; the Taliban killed many Hazaras in the city and murdered nine Iranians, eight diplomats and a journalist, too.[1] However, things changed shortly after this, and during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) Iran strengthened its links with the Taliban.
Under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Taliban set up a command center in Mashhad, inside Iran, to coordinate its military operations in the western Afghanistan.[2] This office transformed to the full-scale shura (leadership council) as a result of the enhanced cooperation between the IRGC and two influential Taliban leaders, Akhtar Mansour and Hibatullah Akhundzada, were and are frequent visitors to Iran, where they received various kinds of support.[3] Mansour, indeed, was killed while returning to Pakistan from Iran.[4]
Military Support And Training
IRGC has supplied substantial financial and military support to the Taliban, including military training. In March 2011, British special forces in Afghanistan discovered that Iran had been providing weapons to the Taliban, including 122-mm rockets, plus training and funding.[5] A 2014 Pentagon report stated that the IRGC had been helping the Taliban groups since at least 2007.[6] The available information says that some parts of the Taliban received 120mm mortars, anti-tank missiles and rockets, 1,000 motorbikes, the Dragunov precision rifle, and the Daraskov long range heavy rifle from the Iranians.[7] Moreover, the IRGC provided substantial funding that reached at some periods up to 190 million USD a year and allowed the Taliban to organize two training bases in Zahidan and Sistan, where they could recruit from among Iran’s Sunnis.[8]
THE DRIVING FACTORS OF IRAN-TALIBAN COOPERATION
Resistance To The Western Military Presence
The advanced level of Tehran’s partnership with the Taliban demonstrates Tehran’s readiness to set aside any historical grudge for the sake of confronting the West, especially the United States. Iranian representatives have established ties with many influential Taliban commanders, including those right at the top of the movement,[9] in order to bleed Western forces militarily in Afghanistan and to prevent the implicit political control of Afghanistan—including a border with Iran—by the Americans.
The Iranian regime has seen itself as in an existential struggle with the US since it came to power in 1979, and the removal of the Taliban, the placing of US troops on one of its borders—and then a second border with Iraq—plus the “axis of evil” speech by President George Bush did little to diminish this perception.[10] This, extensive, long-term support for groups capable of countering Western interests on Afghan territory has been a priority of the IRGC. This military strength—and the vast, illicit investment in Afghan politicians—has given Tehran various cards to play whenever it bargains with the West on various issues.
Combatting Daesh
As Daesh expanded into Afghanistan after the official announcement of their presence in January 2015, with a “Khorasan” wilaya (province or branch) covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia placed under the rulership of Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former Pakistani Taliban leader, Tehran found an ostensible common interest with the Taliban in countering Daesh.[11] At this time, Iran was heavily involved in the US-led coalition effort against Daesh on its western border in Iraq, and the possibility of a Daesh empowerment in Afghanistan was a real concern—as well as an opportunity.
Under the cover of the Daesh global threat, Iran could present its support to the Taliban as an effort to counter worse terrorists, and the Taliban has managed to largely contain Daesh to a few eastern provinces of Afghanistan, namely Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan, all of which border Pakistan. Taliban had its own domestic territorial, financial, and political reasons to resist Daesh encroachments, and the help from the Iranians was welcome. In exchange, the Taliban conducted operations on behalf of Tehran’s interests and provided the Iranians a steady stream of intelligence from western Afghanistan.[12]
Balancing Against Internal And External Forces In Afghanistan
By supporting the Taliban, Tehran has demonstrated a will—and ability—to overshadow Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the traditional external influencers on Afghanistan’s politics. The Taliban has an interest in diversifying its sponsors; it ensures they have options should one sponsor fall (or be forced) away, and in the meantime the sponsors can be played off one-another with promises of influence to improve the Taliban’s supplies of money and weapons. The establishment of Mashhad Shura and the training camps in Iran decreased overwhelming dependence of the Taliban on the Quetta Shura, a de facto department of Pakistan’s secret police, and also dealt another blow to the strategic position and pride of Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s nemesis.
Iran understands that the Taliban will at minimum be a significant party in forming the future Afghan government, so establishing influence over it before it takes power makes strategic sense. Historically, Iran supported the predominantly Shi’a and Persian-speaking political and military groups in Afghanistan, but the Taliban has expanded into the majority of Afghan provinces, including some of the Shi’a ones, and Tehran is pragmatic enough to work with this fact. Additionally, by cooperating with all sides in the Afghan conflict, it gives Tehran greater ability to shape any future intra-Afghan talks about a political settlement.
Iran also has a very specific use for the Taliban—or any other Afghan group that dominates the area—namely ensuring the functionality of the water dams at Kajaki, Kamal Khan, Salma, and elsewhere, north and south in Afghanistan, since those river systems supply the Iranian provinces of Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan.[13]
CONCLUSION
Iran’s relations with the Taliban have converted from enmity to full-scale cooperation over the last quarter-century. Worsening of relations with the West and Saudi Arabia has been a driving factor of in Tehran’s outreach, and the new threat from Daesh provides further cement for the relationship. Iran’s water resource and other interests in Afghanistan also dictate it forming good relations with the group likely to be the dominant power in the next phase.
Still, there are several potential limitations to the partnership between Iran and the Taliban. Firstly, Iran is far from dominant over the Taliban: most of the Taliban leadership remains beholden to Pakistan, and Islamabad has every incentive to try to pull the Taliban leaders in Iran’s orbit away. Secondly, the ongoing peace process between the US and the Taliban aggravates Tehran, which has no interest in the success of this diplomacy. Third and finally, the harsh economic sanctions the US has imposed against Iran, especially its all-important oil industry, plus the coronavirus-induced collapse in the price of oil, might shrink Tehran’s will and capacity to underwrite external partners like the Taliban.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
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REFERENCES
[1] Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, Leila Mahnad. Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown. // The RAND Corporation, 2014. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR616/RAND_RR616.pdf
[2] Mohammed Harun Arsalai, Wil Patrick. Iran’s Shifting Afghan Alliances Don’t Fit Easy Narratives. // Foreign Policy, 18 February 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/18/suleimani-war-quds-iran-shifting-afghan-alliances-dont-fit-easy-narratives/
[3] Antonio Giustozzi. The Taliban at War: 2001 – 2018. // Oxford University Press, 2019.
[4] Carlotta Gall and Ruhullah Khapalwak. Taliban Leader Feared Pakistan Before He Was Killed. // The New York Times, 9 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/world/asia/taliban-leader-feared-pakistan-before-he-was-killed.html
[5] Julian Borger and Richard Norton-Taylor. British special forces seize Iranian rockets in Afghanistan. // The Guardian, 9 March 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/09/iranian-rockets-afghanistan-taliban-nimruz
[6] The United States Department of Defense. Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. // Report of the Department of Defense to the Congress. October, 2014. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf
[7] Antonio Giustozzi. The Taliban at War: 2001 – 2018. // Oxford University Press, 2019.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Oved Lobel. Afghanistan: The Forgotten Front Against Iran. // AIJAC, 16 November 2018. https://aijac.org.au/fresh-air/afghanistan-the-forgotten-front-against-iran/
[10] Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham. What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran. // Middle East Journal, vol. 61, no. 3, 2007, pp. 421–440. www.jstor.org/stable/4330418
[11] Clayton Sharb and Danika Newlee. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). // Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 November 2018. https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k
[12] Antonio Giustozzi. The Taliban at War: 2001 – 2018. // Oxford University Press, 2019.
[13] Aziz Amin Ahmadzai. Iran’s Support for the Taliban Brings It to a Crossroads With Afghanistan. // The Diplomat, 21 May 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/irans-support-for-the-taliban-brings-it-to-a-crossroads-with-afghanistan/
