Dr Akram Umarov, policy analyst
For a long period, radicalization processes in Kyrgyzstan were not investigated adequately. Experts and scholars paid more attention to studying radicalization, the rise of violent extremism, and terrorism in neighboring states. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan has recently turned into one of the hotspots in Central Asia in terms of religious radicalization. The country has not faced a terrorist attacks in significant numbers, but the increasing number of the youth joining the radical and even violent religious groups demonstrates existing shortcomings in the Kyrgyz authorities’ current analysis of the causes of the radicalization and their methods of tackling the issue.
Main Characteristics of the Current Situation with Radicalization in Kyrgyzstan
- Kyrgyzstan avoided large-scale terrorist incidents in the country during its independence period.
In contrast to other states, the attacks in Kyrgyzstan over the past few years have been small-scale and minimally lethal. In 2010, there was an explosion near the sports center, which injured two police officers and an unsuccessful attempt to detonate a bomb near the central police department of Bishkek.[1] The local terrorist group Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of Righteous Ruler) claimed responsibility for these incidents and soon the majority of its members were killed or detained by Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies.[2]
In August 2016, a suicide bomber tried to enter the territory of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek. He blew himself up in his car near the gate of the diplomatic mission. The attacker was killed and three local employees were injured.[3] Kyrgyz authorities said a native of southern Kyrgyzstan, Sirojiddin Mukhtarov (Abu Saloh), the leader of the terrorist group Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (The Holy War and Monotheism Battalion or KTJ), ordered the attack.[4] It is believed that KTJ was also behind the April 2017 bombing of the Metro in Saint Petersburg, which was carried out by a Kyrgyz citizen and killed fourteen people, while wounding fifty.[5]
- The southern regions of the country are considerably affected by the tendency of increasing radicalization among the youth.
The concentration of militancy in the south of the country can be measured in a number of ways. For example, at the peak of its popularity in 2016, about 860 Kyrgyz citizens joined the Islamic State (ISIS), the highest per capita of foreign recruits in all of Central Asia.[6] 77% of these people were from the southern provinces of the country.[7]
Another telling indicator is that 94.5% of people included on the special watch-list by law-enforcement in 2016 lived in the southern regions, nearly half from Jalalabad province and over one-third from Osh province.[8]
According to the large-scale interview of various NGOs in 2013, a fifth of the country endorsed enacting the shari’a in everyday life, and this had the most substantial backing in the southern parts of the country — 62% in Batken and 44% in Osh.[9]
Main Reasons for the Radicalization
- The high-level poverty and unemployment induce the rise of radicalization, especially among young people.
According to the data of the National Statistical Committee for 2017, 25.6% of the population in Kyrgyzstan lived below the poverty line and about 50,000 people were living in desperate poverty.[10] In total, more than 1.6 million people are in poverty, and this concentrates in the southern regions. In 2016, the poverty level in Batken province grew from 37% to 40.5%, and in Osh from 24.6% to 33.5%.[11]
Unemployment remains persistently high level. In 2017, the unemployment rate among young people (ages 15-24) was estimated at 15.9%.[12] This situation has given rise to the phenomenon of labor migration in search of jobs and higher wages. According to the State Migration Service, more than 800,000 citizens of the country work in different countries, mainly in Russia and Kazakhstan, and in 2017 sent almost $2.5 billion in remittances to Kyrgyzstan, the equivalent of 34.3% of the country’s GDP.[13]
- Corruption, inequality, and lack of religious education.
Kyrgyzstan is ranked 132nd out of 180 countries in the “Corruption Perception Index” for 2018.[14] The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that Kyrgyzstan loses $700 million per year to corruption, about 11% of GDP.[15] The survey demonstrated that young people named corruption as one of the biggest problems of the Kyrgyz society and 56% underlined their perception of the state as unjust.[16]
Ethnic tensions in the south of Kyrgyzstan have significantly compounded the issue of living conditions. Ethnic minorities find themselves subject to unequal treatment in finding jobs, receiving education in their own languages, and accessing the judicial system. These factors can form part of a radicalization trajectory.
Additionally, the current system of religious education has proven incapable of propagating a moderate interpretation of the faith to the young. In 2015-16, the Spiritual Administration of Kyrgyz Muslims tested the religious knowledge of imams in all 2,500 mosques in the country and only 800 were able to pass.[17] Moreover, the imams had been unpaid until 2014, when modest salaries were assigned to them.[18]
These deep, overlapping problems create space for extremists to inject their ideas from the bottom-up by offering answers to the marginalized, and from the top-down by offering assistance in return for loyalty to imams who then gain credibility among the youth.
Conclusion
The continuous economic problems of the country in combination with the low efficiency of the public authorities and periodic political perturbations have hindered the implementation of a strategic state policy to prevent and counter religious radicalization. Current socio-economic disparities together with the reluctance and inability of the central government to devise and implement the long-term program of inclusivity are promoting the rise of radical ideologies among the ethnic minorities. Further developing cooperation and exchange of relevant information with different countries concerning the Kyrgyz citizens located in the conflict zones might help to analyze how they ended up joining the terrorist groups and help to suppress their attempts to propagate their radical ideas on Kyrgyz territory.
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References
[1] Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview. // Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, 18 August 2011. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170258.htm
[2] Kyrgyz Court Jails Members Of Terrorist Group. // RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, 19 July 2013. https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-terrorism-sentencing/25051277.html
[3] Tom Phillips. Suicide bomber attacks Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan. // The Guardian, 30 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/bomb-attack-chinese-embassy-kyrgyzstan-bishkek
[4] Uran Botobekov. Central Asian Jihadists Renew its Oath of Allegiance to Al Qaeda Leader. // Modern Diplomacy, 22 January 2019. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/01/22/central-asian-jihadists-renew-its-oath-of-allegiance-to-al-qaeda-leader/
[5] Uran Botobekov. Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad: A faithful follower of al-Qaeda from Central Asia. // Modern Diplomacy, 27 April 2018. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/04/27/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad-a-faithful-follower-of-al-qaeda-from-central-asia/
[6] Anna Matveeva & Antonio Giustozzi (2018) The Central Asian Militants: Cannon Fodder of Global Jihadism or Revolutionary Vanguard?, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 189-206, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1433472
[7] Anna Matveeva (2018) Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan, The RUSI Journal, 163:1, 30-46, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2018.1453013
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation. // International Crisis Group, Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°83, 3 October 2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-state-fragility-and-radicalisation
[10] Poverty rate (per cent). //National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2018. http://stat.kg/en/opendata/category/120/
[11] Maria Levina. Kyrgyzstan: growing poverty and poor state budget. // The Times of Central Asia, 4 August 2018. https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/20086-kyrgyzstan-growing-poverty-and-poor-state-budget
[12] Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate). // The World Bank, September 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=KG
[13] Maria Levina. Kyrgyzstan: different sides of labor migration. // The Times of Central Asia, 28 July 2018. https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/26-opinion-head/20057-kyrgyzstan-different-sides-of-labor-migration
[14] Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. // Transparency International, 2018. https://www.transparency.org/country/KGZ
[15] Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation. // International Crisis Group, Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°83, 3 October 2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-state-fragility-and-radicalisation
[16] Vulnerability and Resilience of Young People in Kyrgyzstan to Radicalization, Violence and Extremism: Analysis Across Five Domains. // Research Institute for Islamic Studies, 1 February 2019. http://voicesoncentralasia.org/vulnerability-and-resilience-of-young-people-in-kyrgyzstan-to-radicalization-violence-and-extremism-analysis-across-five-domains/
[17] Ulan Nazarov. Programme in Kyrgyzstan aims to instil imams with ‘enlightened Islam’. // Caravanserai, 1 February 2017. http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/02/01/feature-01
[18] Timur Toktonaliev. Kyrgyz Imams Tasked With Battling Extremism. // IWPR, 9 December 2016. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kyrgyz-imams-tasked-battling-extremism
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