Annelies Pauwels, Research Fellow at Vlaams Vredesinstituut
The modern right-wing extremist scene has evolved significantly from past manifestations. Only two decades ago, the scene mainly consisted of niche movements — think of neo-Nazi and skinhead groups which were predominantly focused on hatred and violence, perhaps as much against outsiders as against fellow group members. Now, the scene is highly diversified and fragmented. In addition to neo-Nazi groups, it also includes anti-migration movements and militias, Identitarian organizations, and sovereign citizen groups. These different subcurrents are highly active both in the offline and online world and are strongly connected across borders. Today, right-wing extremism has become a more diversified, diffused and truly globalized threat.[1] This article highlights the challenges for P/CVE that emerge from these new trends in right-wing extremism.
Digital Deficit
Right-wing extremists have made use of online communication tools since the early days of the internet in the mid-1980s. Today, however, the internet has come to play an important role in almost all their organizational aspects such as operations, recruitment, and propaganda. Right-wing extremist groups are highly skilled in adopting innovative strategies and tactics such as virtual harassment and intimidation tactics, self-financing through crowdfunding mechanisms, or global outreach through posting manifestos or livestreaming their actions. The internet has also facilitated the creation of an online global movement, consisting of groups and individuals with a more or less a shared ideology and common narratives that adopt a collective identity and hang around in similar spaces, even though they do not necessarily meet online or in person.
The strong and sophisticated online presence of right-wing extremists has brought about increased online monitoring by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In prevention work, however, the digital dimension is still underdeveloped. This is partly due to confusion as to who is responsible for intervening when signals of radicalization occur in the online dimension. Online activities that point to a specific threat — such as searching on the internet for how to create or get access to weapons, or identifying a suitable target for an attack — give intelligence and law enforcement agencies a clear mandate to monitor and intervene.
The situation is different when it concerns early signs of radicalization. Which agency or institution is responsible for detecting, monitoring and intervening when individuals display signals of radicalization that do not indicate an imminent threat? In the offline world, prevention workers such as social workers, educational professionals, or youth workers derive their responsibility to act based on geographical situation. For example, a youth worker is active in a specific neighborhood, social workers focus on individuals based on their place of residence, and teachers focus on youth enrolled in their school. However, the absence of a territorial base of online extremist communities, and the lack of geographic boundaries on the internet, makes it unclear which preventive services or organizations are responsible, or should take the initiative to intervene in the early stages of the radicalization process.
Pilot Initiatives
In past years, several pilot initiatives experimenting with areas such as digital youth work, street work or community-policing have been set up.[2] Despite their good intentions, many of these online prevention initiatives are confronted with a number of recurring challenges. Prevention workers that want to engage in the digital sphere are confronted with ethical, deontological and privacy-related questions. For example, how do youth or street workers establish an online connection with a young individual that posts troublesome content in an online chatroom? Should they use their real name — for the sake of transparency and trust building — or operate under a different name to avoid possible retaliation by right-wing extremist communities? Can they arrange an in-person meeting after a first online engagement? Or does this go against the advice generally given to youngsters to not meet with online strangers? Which data are practitioners allowed to store or share with fellow professionals, given GDPR-regulations? Do they require parental consent when organizing digital youth activities, such as a safe space where young people can openly discuss sensitive topics in a controlled environment?
While many professionals are experienced and comfortable working in a physical space, they may lack the appropriate tools or insights to engage with young people in the digitized world. The digital divide between practitioners and clients that are highly active online may create hurdles to P/CVE interventions. Online subcultures — which are often copied or co-opted by right-wing extremist subcultures — make up very specific environments, with constantly evolving symbols, language, practices and dynamics. For instance, the use of dark humor and memes — which is traditionally part of online fora such as Reddit — may be innocuous, but is often co-opted by violent and extremist subcultures. Practitioners may find it difficult to read what is behind this online content. Is it simply uninvolved humor or something that is driven by hatred, racism and extremism? As such, specialized knowledge is crucial to make sense of the elements of online subcultures that are often absorbed by online right-wing extremist communities.[3]
Innovative Tactics
Right-wing extremist movements have adopted innovative tactics and strategies aimed at disseminating and mainstreaming their fringe views and behavior. Some groups, for instance, engage in legitimate activities, such as political or meta-political endeavors (e.g., running for elections, organizing political rallies), community-building efforts (e.g., setting up community centers, food distribution for the disadvantaged), or intellectual gatherings (e.g., think tanks and conferences, scientific journals).
Far from the typical outfit two decades ago — bomber jacket, shaven head and combat boots — modern right-wing groups also may don themselves a more respectable appearance, either through suit-and-tie attire or branded clothing.[4] Adopting ‘acceptable’ terminology is also an often-used tactic to present extreme ideas in a more moderate way. Identitarian movements, for instance, replaced terms like ‘deportation’ and ‘racial inferiority’ with the more acceptable terms ‘remigration’ and ‘cultural inadequacy’. The growing importance of showcasing female figures, too, is aimed at downplaying the idea that extremism only stems from some sort of toxic masculinity and can embody the whole of society. Female influencers — in particular those embedded in a number of Identitarian movements — are also strategically used as powerful amplifiers of extremist rhetoric, as they can make it more acceptable to a general audience.[5] The aim of these efforts is to blend in as much as possible with mainstream society and further an internalization of extremist narratives and behavior by wider society.
Ambiguity Dilemma
These continued efforts to normalize extremist ideas raise certain challenges from a P/CVE perspective. The ambiguity of current manifestations of right-wing extremism may make it unclear to P/CVE practitioners what exactly should be prevented or combated: they may experience doubts when defining what constitutes extremist content or behavior and which statements or actions are problematic.
Frontline practitioners may struggle to recognize or identify who is behind expressions of extremism. Is it an individual expressing genuine frustrations, fears and concerns? Or rather someone embedded in an extremist milieu with a specific agenda? For instance, right-wing extremist groups actively promote the Great Replacement theory — a preferred narrative aimed at mainstreaming toxic antagonism towards migrant communities and Jews, and distrust towards politics and establishment. Yet, in reality, more people may believe or express certain elements of this theory, for instance, when they are genuinely concerned or angered regarding demographic changes they witness in their immediate environment. Understanding the background and intentions behind radical or extremist expressions becomes an increasingly complicated task for practitioners — in particular, in online settings that do not allow a clear view or understanding of the context and dynamics.
Diverse Audience
The modern right-wing extremist scene is diversified, not only with respect to the various ideological subcurrents, but also in terms of followers and sympathizers. Right-wing extremist movements are attracting a growing diversity of individuals. Young people may be particularly vulnerable to extremism, but right-wing extremism is far from an exclusively youth problem. Neo-Nazi organizations, anti-Islam movements and vigilante groups see a significant involvement of adults.[6]Right-wing lone actors, too, are generally not so young anymore. One research study that analyzed the profiles of lone actor terrorists in the EU showed an average age of 32 years for right-wing lone terrorists — many of them also aged over forty.[7]
Women — traditionally underrepresented in right-wing extremist movements — also play an increasingly important role in the right-wing extremist milieu. The past two decades have seen a sharp increase in the number of female supporters of right-wing extremist movements, as well as the creation of female-centered groups.[8] Right-wing extremism is also not (anymore) a mere phenomenon among socio-economically depressed communities. It is now spreading to individuals from stable and well-off economic classes.[9]
Interestingly, the movement is also attracting military, police and prison staff, as some recent well-known incidents have shown.[10] In 2020, the German domestic intelligence service reported that more than 1,000 individuals working for the German armed forces were suspected of adhering to right-wing extremism. The US army, too, may be confronted with a right-wing radicalization issue. Almost 1 in 5 of the defendants in the capitol riots in early 2021, for instance, had served in the military.[11] The current manifestations of right-wing extremism also present a geographically widespread threat. Whereas radicalization hubs are present in some EU member states — this is the case in certain regions in Germany and the UK — right-wing extremist individuals and groups may have a rather scattered presence in other countries.
Conclusion
The wide diversity of members and sympathizers of right-wing extremist milieus point to the need to diversify the target audience and target locations of P/CVE interventions. This may put additional strains on already limited resources and personnel allocated to P/CVE. A diversified target group also requires rethinking which partners and agencies are able to reach out to the different at-risk groups and individuals. For instance, some key actors in existing P/CVE practices (such as parents, teachers and youth workers) are irrelevant to reach the older segment of right-wing extremist sympathizers. P/CVE programs are also still rare to non-existent in many security-oriented agencies and institutions in most EU member states, such as military and law enforcement or penitentiary facilities.
Extremism is a rapidly evolving phenomenon, which requires constantly evaluating and updating our way of working. P/CVE strategies should keep in mind the ever-evolving context and manifestations of extremism. This may require reaching out to new target groups, re-evaluating current practices, and introducing new work tactics. If local practitioners — pivotal actors in many P/CVE strategies — are to identify how to best respond to today’s manifestations of right-wing extremism and update their current way of working accordingly, local and national policymakers will need to upgrade their support and resources.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
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References
[1] Pauwels, A. (2020). Contemporary manifestations of violent right-wing extremism in the EU: An overview of P/CVE practices, RAN paper.
[2] Mogensen, C.V. & Buch, S. (2022). Hybrid youth and social work, RAN paper.
[3]Fielitz, M. & Ahmed, R. (2021). It’s not funny anymore. Far-right extremists’ use of humor. RAN paper
[4] Miller-Idriss, C. (2018). The extreme gone mainstream: Commercialization and far right youth culture in Germany. Princeton University Press.
[5] Ebner, J. & Davey, J. (2019). How Women Advance the Internationalization of the Far-Right. Perspectives on the Future of Women, Gender & Extremism. George Washington University Program on Extremism.
[6] Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, What is the background of right-wing extremists in Norway?, p. 5.
[7] De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, Analyzing personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists, p. 43.
[8] Ebner, J. & Davey, J. (2019). How Women Advance the Internationalization of the Far-Right. Perspectives on the Future of Women, Gender & Extremism. George Washington University Program on Extremism.
[9] RAN REHAB (2021). How to work with middle-aged target groups without socio-economic needs? RAN Conclusion paper.
[10] RAN POL (2022). Preventing and countering radicalization of police, military and prison staff. RAN Conclusion paper.
