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Home Opinion Pieces Contributors’ Opinions

Has Turkey Mishandled Its Coronavirus Response?

27 August 2020
in Contributors’ Opinions, Opinion Pieces
Has Turkey Mishandled Its Coronavirus Response?
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Sami Moubayed

Article author: Sami Moubayed

 

 

One week after the first Covid-19 case was reported in Turkey in March, a video went viral on social media networks, leaked from Ankara University’s prestigious Ibn Sinai Hospital. It showed a Turkish doctor, later identified as Gule Cinar, saying: “It looks likes like we’ve gotten off to a bad start. We hope we do not become another Italy. The cases are now in the thousands, and not in the hundreds as they [the government] say”.[1]

Turkish authorities at the time were insisting that there were only 191 coronavirus cases in the country and only two deaths. Twenty-four hours later, the doctor apologized, seemingly under pressure from the Turkish government, saying that she was sorry for having caused “a negative public perception”.

Her numbers clearly did not match with those of Turkish officialdom. Something was not right. Six days later, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke of 8,554 coronavirus patients in Turkey, contradicting with his health minister, Fahrettin Koca, who put the number at 2,433.[2] In May, the number of cases were at 126,000 and today the number stands at a whopping 259,692, making it one of the highest in the neighborhood, after Iran [3]. These numbers are of limited utility once allowances are made variations in local testing practices, the dishonesty of authoritarian states like China, and the incapacity to test of chaotic states like Afghanistan and Somalia. The death toll in Turkey, which is a much more reliable number, currently stands at 6,139 (up from 3,397 just three months ago). The infection rate currently stands at 10.6 per 100,000 people, which is high. Turkey’s notoriously packed prisons have proven particularly fertile ground for the spread of the virus.[4]

Over 500 people have recently been arrested on the grounds of challenging the government’s official line on Covid-19. Adding insult to injury, last July Erdogan pushed a law through parliament increasing state control over social media platforms. Companies like Twitter and Facebook are obliged to open offices in Turkey and to respond immediately to government requests for deleting what Erdogan deems as offensive content.[5]

There are many reasons for these high numbers. One is the belated response to the pandemic. Another is the failure of the state to reveal the real figures, fearing that they would create havoc and destroy Turkey’s once-booming economy. Thanks to President Erdogan’s political appetites, his troops are scattered across the world, from Somalia and Qatar to Syria and Afghanistan, creating risks of carrying the virus abroad and/or back to their families.[6]

Stalled Response

When it was time to take action, President Erdogan had to take the difficult decision all world leaders were facing: whether to lockdown and stay safe—but destroy his economy—or to remain open and risk a massive death toll, yet save the economy from collapse. The Turkish leader tried to do both, and ended up with both a large death toll and grave economic damage.

The Turkish economy had been in difficult waters, even before Covid-19. This year, more than 2.5 million people lost their jobs while the Central Bank seems to have burnt through its net reserves in an effort to keep the Turkish lira afloat. Last January, the Central Bank had $40 billion in foreign exchange reserves, but that figure now stands at lower than $25 billion, while state banks have sold at least $32 billion worth of hard currency.[7] This does not seem to have worked: the Turkish lira lost 15% of its value in the first six months of 2020, and on top of that the budget deficit has increased by almost 40%. Foreign investors have fled the country, taking with them a large volume of funds, while the number of tourists dropped by 75%.[8]

The Turkish government’s initial response to the pandemic was issuing a curfew for citizens over-65 and under-20, while banning exit and entry into 31 provinces, including big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. On 30 March, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu complained: “People are moving from Istanbul to the countryside have begun to spread the virus”, urging them to “not go anywhere and stay still”.[9] He then resigned, very surprisingly, citing chaotic measures in dealing with the crisis, but his resignation has been rejected by the President.[10] Instead of viewing this as a red flag and a cause of worry, Erdogan’s treated it as a political challenge saying: “Our President has rejected our interior minister’s resignation … Nobody can axe our unity and solidarity”.[11]

The minister’s resignation was followed by a statement from Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, a member of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), who said that he had not been notified in advance of the lockdown, and therefore was unable to organize public transport or prevent hoarding of goods at supermarkets. He criticized the sudden curfew on Twitter, saying that it triggered “confusion and panic”.[12]

Backtracking on Preventive Measures

Authorities realized that they were incapable of compensating those who were staying at home or the two million people laid off by the lockdown. According to a draft law, workers on leave would be paid compensation of 39 liras ($5.8 USD) per day, which is not enough to make ends meet for the Turkish work force. Nor was the $100 million USD loan that Turkey picked up from the World Bank to strengthen its health services in the fight against Coronavirus.[13]

As early as 5 April, less than one month after the lockdown started, the Turkish government started to gradually relax the curfew, allowing both public and private sector employees to go out, in addition to agricultural workers, saying that they needed to continue work in order to make a living.[14] Then the Turkish government did the most unusual thing—it said that it was the responsibility of the people to stay home and stay safe, which amounted to eschewing all responsibility. That might explain why the number of cases began to rise steadily as of mid-April.

Political Motives

Many have accused Erdogan of taking the preventive measures not as a means of combating Covid-19 but to limit the movement of the main opposition party, the CHP, which thrives and rules the cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The CHP had taken the initiative of fund-raising for families-in-need affected by the lockdown, making the government look weak and ineffective. Erdogan responded by banning their campaign then launching one of his own, donating a seven-month salary to the people.[15] But that too did not trickle down to those in need. A long-time Erdogan ally, businessman Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, issued a written statement criticizing the country’s state-run banks for rejecting emergency loan applications.[16] The Turkish Wealth Fund, chaired by Erdogan, snapped back, saying that Hisarcıklıoğlu’s statement failed to reflect the reality on the ground.[17]

Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has refused to work with opposition-run municipalities in order to deal with Covid-19, explaining why the pandemic burgeoned in these cities, reaching 74,193 cases in Istanbul alone as of late April. The city’s mayor, Imamoglu, became a prominent opponent of Erdogan’s, defeating the AKP—twice—in the mayoral elections last year. It is believed that Imamoglu will be a major contender against Erdogan in the 2023 presidential elections, and success in dealing with Covid-19 could increase his chances of victory. The fear of being voted out of office has shaped Erdogan’s pandemic decision-making, instead of national safety. For that, he has shut down bank accounts set up by the opposition to raise funds for those in need, greatly limiting Imamoglu’s ability to distribute social assistance, especially to those who have been laid off by the lockdown.[18]

On 31 March, Erdogan canceled a fundraising event organized by Imamoglu and Ankara Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas, saying that this was the job of the central government, accusing both men of wanting to create a “state within a state”.[19] On 10 April, the Ministry of Interior started an investigation into the donations campaign that was led by Imamoglu and Yavas.

Making things worse for the Turkish president, Imamoglu is lobbying against the artificial waterway Canal Istanbul, an Erdogan mega-project linking the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara. The mayor believes that the project raises the risk of earthquakes, burdens the cash-strapped economy, and poses ecological threats. When his men posted billboards against the project on 19 August, Erdogan had policemen tear them down. During the pandemic, Istanbul’s revenue declined, prompting the mayor to seek a $575 million USD for the city, but the AKP-led municipality gave him no more than $89 million.[20]

So determined was Erdogan not to cooperate with his opponents that he has persistently turned down offers of help made by scientist Mustafa Ulasli, an expert in molecular behavior trained at the Princeton University in the US.[21] Ulasli has spent an entire decade researching the virus, but was purged from his academic job in 2016, accused of supporting the failed coup against President Erdogan. That crackdown led to the purging of 150,000 healthcare workers, a number of whom have not been reinstated because of suspect ties to Fethullah Gulen, the US-based cleric behind the coup attempt.[22]

“Its difficult to blame the soaring numbers solely on Erdogan”, said Professor Berk Esen of Bilkent University in remarks to EER. “Having said that, there have been major shortcomings in Turkey’s response. First of all, the poor state of Turkish economy and the patronage mechanisms instituted by the AKP have limited the fiscal resources at the government’s disposal for a stimulus package.” The belated curfew was too little too late, he added.

“The government’s policy has a strong class-basis”, Esen went on. “Those who have the luxury to work from home are relatively safe, while others still work outside and face major risks. There have been major problems in the supply chain of masks that could not be distributed to citizens on a massive scale. In addition, the government’s decision to limit the ability of opposition-controlled municipalities to distribute aid and provide social assistance to the needy has hurt many citizens. Rather than working in tandem with local governments, the Erdogan administration challenged them, sabotaged their activities, and failed to distribute government resources efficiently.”

Turkey’s recent discovery of natural gas in the Black Sea might stabilize its budget in the medium term but it will be several years before that product can be brought to market,[23] and Turkey’s problems are more urgent than that, namely a politically-induced “perfect storm” of economic crisis and a mishandled pandemic.

 

European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.

_______________________________

REFERENCES

[1] Kardi, Gursel. “Government’s opacity makes Turkey’s war on Covid-19 harder,” Al-Monitor (March 30, 2020): https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/turkey-government-opacity-makes-war-on-coronavirus-harder.html

[2] Kardi, Gursel. “Government’s opacity makes Turkey’s war on Covid-19 harder,” Al-Monitor (March 30, 2020): https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/turkey-government-opacity-makes-war-on-coronavirus-harder.html

[3] “Turkey has most coronavirus cases outside Europe and the US,” Gulf News (April 19, 2020): https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/covid-19-turkey-has-most-coronavirus-cases-outside-europe-and-us-1.1587317528055

[4] “Turkiya Tukir bi Tafashi Corona,” Al-Ain (April 28, 2020): https://al-ain.com/article/turkey-corona-virus

[5] Emmanouilidou, Lydia. “Turkey passes draconian social media legislation” The World (28 July 2020): https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-07-28/turkey-considers-draconian-social-media-legislation

[6] Yinanc, Barcin. “Virus may have multiplier effect on Turkey’s security challenges,” Hurriyet Daily News (May 4, 2020): https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/virus-may-have-multiplier-effect-on-turkeys-security-challenges-154428

[7] (Gifford, Charlotte. “Could Turkey Coronavirus further weaken the lira,” World Finance (10 August 2020): https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/cold-turkey-coronavirus-further-weakens-the-lira)

[8] Soylu, Ragip. “Turkey’s lira sinks to record low against US dollar” Middle East Eye (6 August 2020): https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-lira-record-low-dollar-economy

[9] Gursel, Kadri. “For Erdogan’s government, it’s the economy first in Covid-19,” Al-Monitor (April 18, 2020): https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-for-erdogan-economy-first-in-coronavirus-crisis-covid.html

[10] “Turkey minister’s resignation exposes tensions in Erdogan’s AKP,” Gulf News (April 15, 2020): https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/covid-19-turkey-ministers-resignation-exposes-tensions-in-erdogans-akp-1.70988945

[11] “Turkey minister’s resignation exposes tensions in Erdogan’s AKP,” Gulf News (April 15, 2020): https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/covid-19-turkey-ministers-resignation-exposes-tensions-in-erdogans-akp-1.70988945

[12] Fox, Tessa. “Brother Tayyip’s Soup Kitchen,” Foreign Policy (April 17, 2020): https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/erdogan-turkey-coronavirus-relief-politics-akp-chp-brother-tayyip-soup-kitchen/

[13] “Turkiyya taktared 100 million dollar min al-Bank Al-Duwali,” Alsharq Alawsat (April 29, 2020): https://tinyurl.com/yb552shs

[14] Gursel, Kadri. “For Erdogan’s government, it’s the economy first in Covid-19,” Al-Monitor (April 18, 2020): https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-for-erdogan-economy-first-in-coronavirus-crisis-covid.html

[15] Gursel, Kadri. “For Erdogan’s government, it’s the economy first in Covid-19,” Al-Monitor (April 18, 2020): https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-for-erdogan-economy-first-in-coronavirus-crisis-covid.html

[16] Bentley, Mark. “Discontent in Turkish business world over Erdogan’s Covid-19 response,” Ahval (12 April 2020): https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-economy/discontent-turkish-business-world-over-erdogans-covid-19-response

[17] Bentley, Mark. “Discontent in Turkish business world over Erdogan’s Covid-19 response,” Ahval (12 April 2020): https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-economy/discontent-turkish-business-world-over-erdogans-covid-19-response

[18] Al-Rayyes, Mohammad. “Ta’teem wa I’tiqalat wa tarabu’at intiqa’iya,” Al-Ain (April 7, 2020): https://al-ain.com/article/blackout-arrests-donations-corona-erdogan-s

[19] Fox, Tessa. “Brother Tayyip’s Soup Kitchen,” Foreign Policy (April 17, 2020): https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/erdogan-turkey-coronavirus-relief-politics-akp-chp-brother-tayyip-soup-kitchen/

[20] Tremblay, Pinar. “Is Turkey’s opposition losing Istanbul to Erdogan?” Al-Monitor (25 August 2020): https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/08/turkey-akp-grabs-authority-of-mayors-with-chp-istanbul-chora.html

[21] Wilks, Andrew. Purged coronavirus expert sidelined,” The National (March 25, 2020): https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/purged-coronavirus-expert-sidelined-in-turkey-1.997333

[22] Hasan, Saleh. “Corona yakshef fashal Erdogan” Al-Ain (April 9, 2020): https://al-ain.com/article/corona-erdogan-policies-destroyed-turkish-economy

[23] Pitel, L. and Sheppard, D. “Turkey hails big gas discovery in the Black Sea,” The Financial Times (August 21, 2020): https://www.ft.com/content/3c3d1600-1001-4239-9f97-c65ec94e8ac5

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