Ryszard Machnikowski, vice-dean for research and international affairs of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz, Poland, and Arkadiusz Legieć, freelance researcher on the post-Soviet region, terrorism (particularly the phenomenon of foreign fighters) and contemporary politics in the Middle East.
Far Right – Potential for Radicalization
In 2018 Poland was shocked by a TV report documenting a secret celebration of the birthday of Adolf Hitler, organized by the radical association “Pride and Modernity”. Yet this event was organized by a group of marginal characters with hardly any influence in Poland.
However, there are other far-right organizations which do not limit themselves to celebrations in the forest and do have some reach.
One of the biggest and most active is the National Radical Camp (ONR). This political party is radically anti-democratic, authoritarian, and fascinated by the fascist wing of the national movement. It dreams about a Poland without Jews, socialists and ethnic minorities and is potentially ready to use violence against its opponents.
From the beginning, ONR has been one of the organizers of the independence march held in Warsaw on November 11 every year. To the detriment of the image of Poland, this event has been attracting radical rightists and nationalists from all over Europe in recent years, with delegations from countries such as Slovakia, Spain, France, Sweden and Hungary.
In 2018, Italian nationalists were represented by the neo-fascists from Forza Nuova. On the march there were also nationalists from the Slovak “People’s Party – Our Slovakia”, who refer in their manifestos to the tradition of the Jozef Tiso, the Nazi collaborator during World II.
Other expected guests in 2018 included members of Nordisk Ungdom, an organization following the tradition of fascism, representatives of the Spanish Democracia Nacional, the Estonian EKRE party, and so-called “identitarians” from Austria. However, most of them were not allowed to enter Poland by the Polish Border Guard.
This internationalization of the event by Polish radical circles is the result of their dynamic contacts with friendly organizations in other countries. They are often are not limited to ideological alignment, but also activities. For example, patrols of beaches in Rimini, implemented by members of the ONR, whose stated aim was to protect Polish tourists from aggressive immigrants after the rape of a Polish woman in Rimini in 2016 by a group of African immigrants.
Foreign Fighters in Ukraine – The Polish Context
Poland is directly adjacent to Ukraine, where armed conflict is ongoing and attracting foreign fighters from around the world. The consequence for Poland is frequent arrivals of foreign fighters from Ukraine, including fighters from Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Serbia.
They have organized cash collections for their activities, interacted with Polish paramilitary and extremist environments, carried out paramilitary training on Polish territory, and even been trained by the “European Academy of Security” in Wroclaw.
Poland’s transit role for foreign fighters is also significant. It includes nationals from Finland, Norway, France or Austria going to Ukraine, using Polish airports or road crossings. The Danish Chechens headed by Isa Munajew crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border illegally in 2014. This phenomenon led the Polish Border Guard to stop foreign fighters before they crossed the border with Ukraine.
About 30 foreign fighters from Poland took part in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, on both sides . The main motivation for choosing sides in the conflict is personal attitudes towards Russia and Ukraine.
Ukraine is a popular destination among representatives of extreme right-wing organizations, such as the National Radical Camp (ONR) and the Great Poland Camp, or neo-fascist organizations such as Falanga .
On the Ukrainian side, the Poles were active, inter alia, in the ranks of the Azov Regiment, as well as within the framework of the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps.
On the part of the separatists, the largest group of Poles were present in Battalion Rusich, Battalion Prizrak or Battalion Kalmius, as well as the civic Militia of Novorossia.
Poland is one of six European Union member states which stipulate by law that joining foreign armed forces without the prior authorization of the state authorities is punishable by imprisonment.
Regardless of this fact, Poland has its foreign fighters not only in its immediate vicinity with the Ukrainian conflict, but also with groups involved in the massive mobilization of foreign fighters in the war in Syria.
They include both jihadists and volunteers fighting on the side of the Kurdish forces. The paramilitary group “Wrath of Euphrates” was under the leadership of a former Polish soldier, who went by the pseudonym “Archer” .
Still, the number of Polish citizens involved in militant activity in the Middle Eastern and North African conflicts only reaches the tens rather than hundreds and is notably low in comparison to Poland’s Western neighbors .
Jihadis in Poland
Poland lacks a strong internal social base for the preparation of jihadi attacks and it is not the host of significant jihadi networks. There is also no sign of extensive interest in targeting Poland by the external jihadi networks. As a result, in 2018, as in previous years, there were no major and deadly terrorist incidents connected to radical jihadi ideology.
Nevertheless, there are some minor groups connected to foreign jihadi organizations which have served as logistical bases for jihadi militants entering Poland.
Security services have intervened in the past, carrying out arrests that led to the prosecution of suspects connected to jihadi networks. Three such cases are worth recalling.
The first is Dawid Ł., the Polish jihadi fighter in Syria whose trial started in November 2017, revealing some insights into his activity .
Dawid Ł. was born in the small town of Radom in 1992. He emigrated to Norway with his parents in 1998. Dawid Ł. had initial contacts with radical Islamic organizations in Norway, where he converted to Islam in 2012.
In 2014 he and his wife, Małgorzata B., travelled via Turkey to Syria. While staying near Aleppo, he joined the local jihadi organization Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya. This organization was a part of the wider Islamic Alliance and co-operated closely with Jabhat al-Nusra.
When Dawid Ł. visited Norway in April 2015, he was detained by the Norwegian security service PST and finally deported to Poland in September 2015, where he was arrested at Warsaw Airport. He was connected to the small network of Polish citizens who travelled from Poland to fight in Syria.
The second case is a foreign citizen arrested in Poland in autumn 2016. In February 2018, the Katowice district attorney issued an indictment against Mourad T., a 28 year-old Moroccan and allegedly an accomplice of Abdelhamid Abaaoud .
Mourad T was arrested on 5 September 2016 in the city of Rybnik, Silesia, where he rented a flat, by the Polish internal security service ABW, acting on a tip-off from a western intelligence service.
He came to Poland in spring 2016 after a long journey through the Balkans and Central Europe. He travelled under a false alias as a Syrian teenager, Mourad Sultan, born on 22 November, 1996 in Halab. His false identity was legalized in Austria in February 2015. He was in constant contact with major jihadi networks in Western Europe and was accused of being a member of a terrorist organization.
The third case concerns a group of Russian citizens of Chechen origin. All three were detained in May 2015 in Bialystok on a set of charges of financial and logistical support for an illegal armed group.
In June 2018, the appeal court in the district of Bialystok sustained an earlier district court’s decision to sentence these Chechen militants, who had been charged with supporting the Caucasus Emirate, an illegal jihadi organization . At the same time, the appeal court cleared them of the accusation of belonging to Islamic State.
Another Russian citizen of Chechen origin, Alvi A., was arrested by the domestic security service ABW on 28 November 2018 . He was accused of fighting for Islamic State in the Middle East and had extensive contacts with foreign nationals in Poland who have expressed support for Islamic radicals. These unnamed foreign nationals were deported as a result of ABW’s decisive action against jihadi circles in Poland in 2018.
The Outlook
At present we think that the Polish radical right and left and jihadi networks are not likely to get involved in terrorist activities in Poland.
Jihadi networks are a potential threat, but it is highly likely that they perceive Poland as a place for Jogistical and support activities for militants from Western Europe rather than a target.
As for the radical right and left, they can be swayed by the Poland’s constantly changing political scene and can be pushed into more violent actions by their perceptions of political reality here. Poland, like every country, always needs to look out for its very own home-grown and home-made radicals, who can be potential threats to social and political order.
An example is a man from Olsztyn in the northeast who was detained by the ABW in winter 2017. He had been preparing an attack on the constitutional institutions of Poland – the President, the Prime Minister, and Parliament . For this purpose, the man accumulated almost 300 kilograms of explosives and substances for their production, almost half a kilometer of fuses and detonators, 25 weapons, including automatic rifles, and 25,000 rounds of ammunition.
Once again, terrorism or political violence by domestic or external organizations is still only of a potential nature. But the actions of the radical rightist, leftist and jihadi organizations or networks should be constantly monitored by the security services and they must be stopped from evolving into fully fledged terrorist groups.
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References
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