Indi Phillips, an Australian research analyst based in Lebanon
Deradicalization and rehabilitation programs for prisoners the world over are based squarely on the assumption that there is a public and governmental will to rehabilitate prisoners. Additionally, that prison environments are, if not pleasant, at least controlled and systematized. What occurs when this is not the case?
This article expands on a previous examination of the Lebanese Roumieh Central Prison, Block B, environment, which illustrated the prison-internal situation in terms of overcrowding, smuggling, prisoner governance and indirect radicalization processes.
The current article further explores why the deradicalization of Block B’s inhabitants is not within the interests of prisoners nor external parties. Data is drawn from nine extensive interviews with ex-inmates, prison support staff and judicial sources from the justice ministry, prison authorities, and legal representatives of prisoners.
A Word on Roumieh Central Prison, Block B
Roumieh Prison is situated approximately twelve kilometres inland from Beirut. Of the seven blocks, three hold prisoners on terrorism charges. Block B houses the majority (850) of these individuals. Overcrowding within the prison is at a critical point, torture and drug consumption is habitual; it is a hostile environment. The security of every block is severely compromised with an alleged guard presence of between one and two per floor.[1]
Inside Block B, sophisticated prisoner-constructed hierarchies, enforcing block approved behavioral norms, act as governance mechanisms for the population, creating an impenetrable block society. Additionally, Roumieh holds inmates according to religious denomination, rather than crime, resulting in mono-religious and mixed-crime cells. The end result is an inmate population overseen by political bodies that manipulate and intensify sectarian differences, while transferring criminal and terrorist skills among inmates.[2]
The cohesiveness of the block and its external use by powerful Lebanese elements renders the introduction and implementation of rehabilitation procedures a difficult task.
Deradicalization Theories and Practices
Broad policy and academic discussions on deradicalization initiatives for incarcerated individuals focus on several key concepts. These include models of segregation vs. integration,[3] the role that the community and family play in prisoner rehabilitation, the requirements for systematized and functional incarceration settings, specialized staff, reasonable prison conditions and a reliable, authoritative body which oversees the facility.[4]
Individuals in Block B are held in accordance to the segregation model. As a sectarian state, social disruptions regularly arise in Lebanon as individuals from different religious denominations share space. This often gives way to security issues, even outside the prison walls. For this reason, Roumieh maintains chiefly sectarian blocks.
Block A at Roumieh houses mostly Shi’is and Block B mostly Sunnis. While dampening sectarian violence, this method of holding inmates means that neutralization of extreme ideologies and behaviors through dilution is not possible. Instead, an intensification and amplification process takes place through sectarian segregation.
A theoretical positive of the segregation model is that group isolation allows for ease of monitoring and risk assessment of the prisoners. However, given enormous overcrowding (300%) and under-resourced guard presence, which leads to an inverse prisoner-guard relationship, the nominal authorities are unable to exercise effective authority.[5] Therefore, even if monitoring and risk assessment of Block B prisoners was possible, it would not be a priority.
The application of family and community-based methods of ideology and behavioral neutralization are highly complex given that, for many families there is a social currency attached to having a brother, son, or husband in groups such as Fatah al-Islam. In the context of perceived gain in fostering this membership within the prisoners’ family, deradicalization and withdrawal of prisoners from these groups does not serve the prisoner nor family (see section ‘In the Interests of the Community’ for further detail).
The absence of reasonable living conditions and lack of guard authority means that access to nutritious food, space, and physical safety is dependent on the individual’s ability to attach themselves to powerful block leaders, who are all from extremist groups. A vital element in the indirect radicalization process is survival and personal gain.
Maintenance of Physical Safety in a Hostile Environment
As found in previous research, the maintenance and intensification of extremist ideology may be engaged in for material and personal gain, particularly within incarceration.[6] This behavior is seen in Block B where personal gain refers to ingratiating oneself with powerful figures within the community in order to maintain a degree of physical safety and access necessities for basic living.[7]
Prisoners without political or financial power require the protection of others within the system in order to survive. For this reason, ideologies and identities are often adopted or intensified for no other reason than maintenance of personal security, the right to sleep in a slightly less crowded cell, or access to food.[8]
Any rejection of block-approved behavior (turning away from violent extremism, for example) is therefore, not in the best interests of the prisoners.
Block B Governance
The internal structures within Block B are sophisticated and well-developed: regular election processes, a functional internal court system used to enforce behavior endorsed by the block culture and to punish contradicting behavior, committees for social, health and crime and punishment all form the backbone of Block B governance.[9] These structures make for a tightly bound and organized block, creating a version of a miniature society, governed by internally developed and regulated codes of behavior. The highly structured nature of Block B means that individuals on the inside are required by pseudo-law to behave in accordance with block expectations, creating an internal environment which makes implementation of deradicalization programs difficult at best.
“Political References”
Block B is overseen by minimal security staff. The imbalance between guards and prisoners, with the former so overwhelmed numerically, creates a reality that is unavoidable. The only way guards can try to rectify this is by manipulating the population through deals and resource smuggling, allegedly supported by what sources term “political references”.
These references are not named by sources directly, however they were described as holding positions in Cabinet. The role of these references is best illustrated through what was revealed in a security forces raid in 2015, which showed that Block B was used as an operations room for several terrorist attacks from 2013 to 2015.[10] Security forces found computers, mobile phones and large amounts of cash.[11] Before the 2015 raid, political references were allegedly supplying Block B inmates with protein, nutritious food, fresh fruit and vegetables, technology, hard cash, and extended visitors’ rights.[12]
To illustrate the relative luxury afforded by political attention, one ex-inmate alleged that the top floor of Block B was, prior to 2015, given over to the largest figures in Fatah al-Islam, with each cell watched over by muscular prisoners who played the role of bodyguard to the figure inside.[13] These rooms were decorated, contained mattresses supported by bedframes, and doubled as visiting rooms for inmates and their wives. In return for these luxuries, influential prisoners allegedly granted political bodies large swathes of voters in their home districts.[14]
Additionally, sources described the tactical manipulation of Block B prisoners by the opposing Shi’i and Sunni blocks within the Lebanese government. The Shi’a body uses the presence of Sunni militias and terrorist attacks and their large incarceration rate, as well as ability to coordinate attacks even from within prison, as a tool to discredit the Sunni population and Sunni political rivals. The Sunni political body, on the other hand, uses the large-scale of arrests of their community and continued poor living conditions in a victimhood narrative, which has dominated the Sunni population in Lebanon’s sectarian political environment and indeed across the region.[15, 16]
Preservation and support of Block B’s population in its current state of extremism, violence, and capability seems, then, to serve political interests on both sides of Lebanese politics well beyond the walls of the prison.
In the Interests of the Community
Actions carried out within Block B have been recognized and applauded in Islamic State propaganda material,[17] giving those within Block B a distinctive status within the Sunni extremist movement.
Sources described a social currency attached to connections with, and loyalty to, militant Sunni groups. This social currency is relevant both outside prisons, where prestige attaches itself to the families of detainees, and internally, where prestige acts as a membership mechanism, helping to reinforce in-group and out-group relationships.[18]
Additionally, sources alleged that instead of resource smuggling, powerful prisoners might request political references to financially support their families.[19]
This state of affairs strengthens prisoners’ motivations to remain as contributors and participators in the block culture as the reward system is tied directly to their family’s support and well-being.
Conclusion
Examination of the state of extremism inside Roumieh provides vital insight into the likely state of play across the region, particularly if governments support or abet Islamist groups, as has happened with Turkey and some Syrian rebel groups.[20]
Analysis and thorough research of how prison internal and prison external factors to maintaining the status quo, constitute the first steps toward designing programs which may function successfully within this context.
An understanding of power dynamics around the families and communities of prisoners in relation to political pressures and financial incentives explains what prevents rehabilitation programs from approaching support networks that could be positioned to deliver interventions.
Finally, developing and focusing attention on how these prison environments are composed, reinforced, and perpetuated also prepares incarceration facilities in the European Union, Britain, and the United States for returning foreign fighters who may have been held in such facilities.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
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REFERENCES
[1] NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”
[2] Judicial Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 1/9.”, Judicial Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 2/9.”, Judicial Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 3/9.”
[3] Jones, Clarke R., and Resurrecion S. Morales. 2012. “Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalization.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35(3): 211–28.
[4] UNODC. 2016. “Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons.” https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf (October 21, 2019).
[5] Judicial Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 1/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”
[6] Harper, Erica, and Fabien Scotti. 2018. Reconceptualizing the Drivers of Violent Extremism : An Agenda for Child & Youth Resilience. Egypt: Terre des hommes – helping children worldwide & WANA Institute. https://www.tdh.ch/en/media-library/documents/extremism-child-youth-tdh (December 9, 2019).
[7] Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”, NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”
[8] Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”
[9] Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”, NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”
[10] BBC. 2015. “Lebanon Prison Raided over Inmates’ Links to Bombing.” BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30777426 (September 10, 2019).
[11] Naharnet Newsdesk. 2015. “Notorious Roumieh Prison’s Block B Under Control of Security Forces.” Naharnet. http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/162605 (September 13, 2019).
[12] Judicial Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 1/9.”, NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”
[13] Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”
[14] Judicial Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 2/9.”, NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”
[15] Judicial Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 2/9.”, NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”
[16] al-Haj Saleh, Yassin. 2015. “The Just Oppressors: Middle Eastern Victimhood Narratives and New Imagined Communities.” Al Jumhuriya. https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/content/just-oppressors-middle-eastern-victimhood-narratives-and-new-imagined-communities (December 11, 2019).
[17] Liban : La Prison de Roumieh, Un Fief Pour Les Jihadistes de l’EI. 2015. Paris, France. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42rJPZSH5mY (October 30, 2019).
[18] Tajfel, Henri. 1979. “Individuals and Groups in Social Psychology*.” British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 18(2): 183–90.
[19] Judicial Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 1/9.”, NGO Source, Anon. 2019c. “Interview 9/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019a. “Interview 4/9.”, Prisoner Source, Anon. 2019b. “Interview 5/9.”
[20] Starr, Stephen. 2014. “A Deeper Look at Syria-Related Jihadist Activity in Turkey.” Combating Terrorism Center 7(8): 4.
