Mohammed Sinan Siyech, a doctoral scholar at the Islamic and Middle East Studies Department at the University of Edinburgh and Visiting Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. He was previously a Senior analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
Introduction
With the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in June 2014 and its expansive digital footprint, much security attention was focused on the group and its brutal activities in Iraq and Syria. This attention was also present in South Asia, which has long been a hot bed of insurgency and militant groups. However, shortly after, another group also announced its existence, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which has achieved some level of success in maintaining its presence in the region. This article will explore the nature of AQIS in South Asia, looking at Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, as well as its rivalry with ISIS in the region.
Primarily, this article argues that AQIS, which was formed to maintain a South Asian presence for Al-Qaeda, was already successful when measured against its aims in the year 2020. With the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, this success was further enhanced. However, at the same time, AQIS has had to contend with the fact that its rival group, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), has launched several attacks (both verbally and physically) against AQIS, its parent organization Al-Qaeda Central (AQC), and their host organization, the Taliban. These attacks have hampered AQIS’ growth as much as counter-terrorism operations did, combined with a tottering leadership of AQC. This paper thus grapples with these implications when mapping out future trajectories of AQIS.
As such, the paper is divided as follows. It first documents the history of AQIS in the region by examining the rise of AQC since the 1980s. Discussing the successes of AQIS, it then engages with how AQIS has benefitted from the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. In the next section, it examines how ISIS poses a challenge to its presence in the region and specifically Afghanistan. Finally, it provides a projection of scenarios for the future of AQIS.
The History of AQIS in South Asia
Al-Qaeda has had a decades-long history in the South Asia region owing to its formation at the end of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s. The group was later provided sanctuary by the Taliban as it gathered strength in Afghanistan in the 1990s. However, after the Taliban regime was deposed by the United States and NATO after 9/11, Al-Qaeda had to shift its traditional base from Afghanistan to areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan.[1] Al-Qaeda maintained several training camps in FATA, taking advantage of a lack of governance in the region. Most of AQC’s command structure was present in these two countries, making them among the most important nations for Al-Qaeda’s operations to continue.[2]
Towards the mid-2010s, as Al-Qaeda’s popularity and influence began waning against the backdrop of ISIS’s rising popularity and eventual formal emergence as a “caliphate” in 2014, Al-Qaeda began making moves to establish a formal South Asian branch. In September 2014, the group officially heralded the arrival of its newest affiliate, AQIS. As some analysts suggested, this was also to ensure that it managed to salvage its weak reputation in South Asia vis-à-vis ISIS.[3]
AQIS came to notice almost immediately after it was announced by attempting a series of attacks that month in Pakistan, including the takeover of a naval frigate, attempts to attack American targets at sea, and the assassination of Brigadier General Zahoor Fazal Qadri. Much of their operations were concentrated in Waziristan and the Punjab province, with the other major center of activity being Karachi, where many of their members are present.[4]
In Afghanistan, the group members attached itself to the Taliban after pledging allegiance to the latter and strengthened the Taliban’s efforts to fight against the US and other NATO military forces. While AQIS’ numbers are not extremely high, they are quite effective given this attachment. A United Nations Security Council report estimated that AQC had 400 to 600 fighters in twelve different provinces of Afghanistan and an additional 100 across South Asia as of June 2020.[5] Yet, the group has been engaged in attacks across different parts of the region.
Simultaneously, AQIS began to assume some prominence in other parts of South Asia through the same force-multiplier model. In Bangladesh where Al-Qaeda was already present, AQIS inserted itself through its ally, Ansar al-Islam (AAI), a group previously allied with Al-Qaeda, which renewed its pledge of allegiance to AQIS and launched several attacks, notably on secular bloggers for supposedly defaming Islam.[6] While no numbers exist as to their current presence, AQIS has continued to operate via such actors as AAI.
In India, AQIS mainly established a physical presence in the insurgency-affected theatre of Kashmir. It managed to headhunt a prominent individual, Zakir Musa, from a pre-existing radical group, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), to help form Ansar Ghazwat al-Hind (AGH) in 2017, as documented in further sections below.[7] In the rest of India, Al-Qaeda operatives were arrested for attempting attacks on politicians and for also trying to recruit Rohingyas from refugee camps.
Notwithstanding the above AQIS undertakings, many analysts have argued that Al-Qaeda and its branches, especially AQIS, is a spent force. AQIS, particularly, showed immense potential to conduct attacks but was thwarted in its first foray in 2014 and never managed to make shockwaves in the security establishment, barring a few attempts to recruit people.[8] Thus, the absence of attacks made security establishments in South Asia heave a collective sigh of relief.
However, contrary analysis also suggested that the primary aim of AQIS was to maintain a presence in the region for when it would be able to gain strength significantly.[9] This is a strategy that Al-Qaeda branches have long managed to master. The most prominent example of this would be Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen, which has conquered and governed large swathes of land twice—in 2011 and in 2015—for a year apiece.[10]
Thus, the fact that AQIS managed to stand its ground despite a weak presence, opposition from government forces, and tough competition from ISIS (also discussed further below), means that the group has succeeded in fulfilling its aim of maintaining a South Asian presence. This success was further enhanced by the revitalized fortunes of the Taliban in 2021, its ally and host in Afghanistan.
AQIS after Taliban’s Return to Power
Perhaps the biggest boost that Al-Qaeda managed to get was the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan in August 2021. This victory took place after the United States, under President Donald Trump, signed a “deal” with the Taliban in 2020 to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan, ostensibly contingent on the Taliban depriving groups like Al-Qaeda of safe haven.[11]
As the US withdrawal drew closer in 2021, however, it was becoming clear that the Taliban had no intention of cutting ties with, or curtailing the activities of, its ally, Al-Qaeda. This became evident when UN reports began to document the continuing presence of the group within Taliban-controlled areas.[12] A US raid conducted in May 2020 led to the apprehension and elimination of several top members of Al-Qaeda in Taliban territory, further demonstrating the linkages between the two groups.[13]
After the Taliban blitzkrieg across Afghanistan and the US withdrawal put the Taliban in control of the entire state infrastructure in August 2021, Al-Qaeda’s position further strengthened. Taliban’s spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid effectively rejected, in public, the US claim that the deal committed the Taliban to weakening their relations with Al-Qaeda, saying that “nowhere in the agreement has it been mentioned that we have or don’t have ties with anyone. In fact, the issue of relations is not considered. What has been agreed upon is that no threat should be posed from Afghan soil to the US and its allies.”[14] This does not portend well for regional security agencies and nations hoping to rid the region of Al-Qaeda’s presence.
Moreover, it is telling that AQIS’ propaganda seemed to have reflected its mood and the situation on the ground. For example, since 2020, when the deal was announced with the United States, AQIS has released several propaganda pieces congratulating the Taliban on defeating the US and ejecting them from Muslim lands.[15] Since then, AQIS has changed its magazine name from Nawai Afghan Jihad to Nawai Ghazwat ul-Hind (Voice of the Conquest of India), spelling out where their energies could be focussed after the US’ complete withdrawal[16].
In September and October 2021, the group also released two propaganda videos specifically targeting India and Kashmir. The first video, entitled, “Do not sit idly by,” was a collection of short videos highlighting alleged persecution of Muslims in India and urging Muslims to take revenge for all the problems heaped on it by the current Indian government.[17] The video seemed to have featured some desperation and annoyance with the Indian Muslims for not doing anything to uplift jihad in the nation, according to at least one analyst.[18]
The second video, entitled, “Kashmir is Ours,” was far more nuanced, focussing on the conflict zone of Kashmir, whereby the group exhorted Kashmiri Muslims to reject Pakistani support via its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[19] This is consistent with its previous propaganda, where AQIS and its Kashmiri branch, AGH, denounced Pakistan for derailing the Kashmiris from participating in “true” jihad.[20]
At the same time, AQIS has engaged in some activity outside of its base in Afghanistan. In November 2021, Pakistani security services apprehended an individual in the Punjab province, who had apparently intended to conduct attacks against different government structures in Pakistan.[21] The individual was arrested with a significant cache of weapons including guns, bazookas, and grenade launchers signifying a potential security nightmare had he been successfully averted.
Perhaps the one other challenge to AQIS, apart from the security agencies, will be the strength of ISIS, which has constantly criticized Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and the Taliban for compromising on its principles and making deals with nations like the United States. ISIS has also tried hard to poach members of Al-Qaeda in various parts of South Asia, including in Kashmir and Bangladesh, although it has not always managed to breakthrough.[22] Nonetheless, it remains a threat to AQIS’ ambitions in the region.
Evaluating AQIS’ Future in the Region
Several threat scenarios can be considered for AQIS’ future in the region. Given that AQC’s leadership has been in tatters over the last few years,[23] it is possible that AQIS may also be suffering from the same lack of leadership, despite successfully achieving its objective of survival. After all, survival does not move the group forward or expand it.
It is likely, then, that the continued success of the Taliban could provide AQIS and its parent body more impetus to reshape its objectives and think of expanding its presence and operations across South Asia. This is possible given that the group has a safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where it can regroup and swell its ranks.
Moreover, there is a high chance that AQIS, like AQC, will encourage more aspiring jihadists across South Asia and other parts of the world to migrate to Afghanistan and join its ranks. This observation was made by social media intelligence specialist Rita Katz who noted that after the Taliban’s victory, various social media groups and channels were rife with discussions of migration to Afghanistan.[24] Bangladeshi officials similarly confirmed such assessments, reporting that a few of its citizens had travelled to Afghanistan to join jihadist groups there[25].
It is quite likely that once AQIS is able to increase its membership and conduct appropriate training for them, it could also encourage attacks in different parts of South Asia to assert its presence as a dominant group. Ambitious plans like capturing Pakistani navy ships to cause trouble between Pakistan and India are also not off the table given a similar incident in 2014.[26] A further dimension is that, with the potential increased presence of different individuals from across South Asia, there is also a major opportunity for cross pollination of ideas and the formation of jihadist networks across the region.
India will have to pay attention to the group’s presence and its propaganda. In South Asia, India has become the new major enemy for jihadists, courtesy of the supposedly anti-Muslim policies of the right-wing Hindu government in place and the marginalization of Muslims in the nation. AQIS referenced this as early as 2017 in its “Code of Conduct” document when it declared its intent to target India.[27] Apart from the Hindu right-wing activities, it also referenced India’s interference in states like Bangladesh, its alliance with Israel and the US, and its promotion of secularism in Muslim nations, notwithstanding the erosion of secular values in India itself.
Yet, AQIS is not going to have an easy path to growth and successful attacks. As mentioned in the previous section, ISIS has proved itself a tough competitor to AQIS and its allies, including the Taliban. ISIS has repeatedly censured Al-Qaeda and AQIS for the alliance with the Taliban—a group that will at some point have to collaborate with other nation-states to ensure its survival, given the acute food and employment crises Afghanistan is facing. This means that the more hardcore members of Al-Qaeda and AQIS, averse to any further perceived pragmatic accommodation by the Taliban with “infidels,” can be headhunted to join ISIS at some point, thus weakening AQIS.
Finally, counter-terrorism agencies in South Asia are keeping a close watch on developments in Afghanistan and have been taking steps to ensure that the security situation within their own nations does not deteriorate as a result of the Taliban’s victory.[28] As a policy directive, this should also mean that the countries co-operate more closely with one another, setting aside the various problems that already beset the region regarding bilateral and multilateral relationships.
Conclusion
AQIS has worked over the years since its announcement in 2014 to establish itself as a group that survives everything thrown at it. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 2021 means that AQIS will potentially have the time and space to re-evaluate its own objectives and relationship with its parent group, AQC. In threat scenario terms, this could mean that AQIS will think of expanding its numbers, forging a network across South Asia, and trying to conduct more attacks against targets in South Asia.
Yet, AQIS’ ambitions will likely be tempered, not just by counter-terrorism departments across the region, but also by ISIS, with whom it will continue to contend for the top spot in the jihadist landscape. This could be a means of limiting the group, or, conversely, it could also push AQIS into carrying out more serious attacks in an effort to outbid ISIS across a region that remains volatile.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
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References
[1] Rohan Gunaratna and Peter Nielsen, “Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan and beyond”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(9), 775–807.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Alexander Reed. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement. 2016. The Hague: International Center for Countering Terrorism.
[4] Animesh Roul. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: Spearheading Jihad 2014 – 2020. New Delhi: Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict. 2020.
[5] United Nations Security Council. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Report. New York: UNSC. 2020
[6] Mohammed Sinan Siyech. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: comparing the movement in India and Bangladesh. Journal of Policing, Counter Terrorism and Intelligence, 64 – 82. 2020.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “Indian Muslims and jihadist failures: Past and future”, ORF, August 21, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indian-muslims-jihadist-failures-past-future/
[9] Mohammed Sinan Siyech. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: comparing the movement in India and Bangladesh. Journal of Policing, Counter Terrorism and Intelligence, 64 – 82. 2020.
[10] “Their Fate is Tied to Ours”: Assessing AQAP Governance and Implications for Security in Yemen”, ICSR Reports, October 28, 2019, https://icsr.info/2019/10/28/their-fate-is-tied-to-ours-assessing-aqap-governance-and-implications-for-security-in-yemen/
[11] “Afghanistan: US-Taliban deal hastened Afghan collapse, defence officials say”, BBC, September 29, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58738953
[12] United Nations Security Council. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Report. New York: UNSC. 2020
[13] “Key Al-Qaeda leader killed in Afghanistan”, Economic Times, May 25, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/key-al-qaeda-leader-killed-in-afghanistan/articleshow/78856536.cms
[14] “Interview with Taliban’s Zabihullah Mujahid: Full Transcript”, Tolo News, July 21, 2021, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173452
[15] “AQIS Congratulates Taliban on Afghanistan Conquest”, Site Intelligence News, August 24, 2021, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/aqis-congratulates-taliban-on-afghanistan-conquest.html
[16] Rezaul Laskar and Adil Mir, “Al-Qaeda’s India affiliate hints at shifting focus to Kashmir”, Hindustan Times, March 22, 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/al-qaeda-s-india-affiliate-hints-at-shifting-focus-to-kashmir/story-QgsOfxqfqe17uwYfs13pIJ.html
[17] Kabir Taneja, “Under the Taliban bonnet: Al-Qaeda—ISKP rivalry and its security implications for India”, October 16, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/under-the-taliban-bonnet/
[18] Hari Prasad, “Still No Storm in the Ocean: New Jihadist Narratives on Indian Islam”, Hudson Institute, April 01, 2021, https://www.hudson.org/research/16951-still-no-storm-in-the-ocean-new-jihadist-narratives-on-indian-islam
[19] Kabir Taneja, “Under the Taliban bonnet: Al-Qaeda—ISKP rivalry and its security implications for India”, October 16, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/under-the-taliban-bonnet/
[20] Safwat Zargar, “In Kashmir, claimed Al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind may be struggling to survive”, Scroll, January 07, 2019, https://scroll.in/article/907269/in-kashmir-al-qaedas-putative-affiliate-ansar-ghazwat-ul-hind-may-be-struggling-to-survive
[21] “AQIS terrorist arrested in Pakistan’s Punjab province”, New Indian Express, November 09, 2021, https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2021/nov/09/aqis-terrorist-arrested-in-pakistans-punjab-province-2381491.html
[22] Mohammed Sinan Siyech and Suraj Ganesan, “Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State’s rivalry in South Asia”, ORF, January 11, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-states-rivalry-in-south-asia/
[23] Barak Mendehlson and Colin Clarke, “Al-Qaeda Is Being Hollowed To Its Core”, War on the Rocks, February 24, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/al-qaeda-is-being-hollowed-to-its-core/
[24] Rita Katz, “Future of Al-Qaeda, ISIS & Jihadism”, Wilson Center, August 27, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/future-al-qaeda-isis-jihadism
[25] “Why are Bangladeshi militants migrating to Afghanistan?”, Daily Star, July 29, 2021, https://www.thedailystar.net/star-multimedia/news/why-are-bangladeshi-militants-migrating-afghanistan-2140111
[26] Alexander Reed. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement. 2016. The Hague: International Center for Countering Terrorism.
[27] Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS): Renewing Efforts in India”, Middle East Institute, September 19, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/al-qaeda-indian-subcontinent-aqis-renewing-efforts-india
[28] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “What Does a Taliban Government Mean for the Rest of South Asia?”, The Diplomat, July 23, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/what-does-a-taliban-government-mean-for-the-rest-of-south-asia/
